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Abstract
The current research examined the strategies implemented by liars, the relationships
between these strategies and psychological processes related to deception, and the implications
of these associations on perceptions of deceptive statements. In general, deception research has
either ignored or superficially examined the types of strategies that individuals use to construct
lies. However, these strategies may have significant impact on characteristics of the lie itself,
and in turn, perceptions of the lie.
Study 1 explored the various strategies that liars use and the association of these
strategies to psychological processes involved in lying. Results demonstrated that participants
used a wide range of strategies. Some relied solely on gist memory, others on verbatim, and
others involved a mix of these forms of memory. There was also a relationship between this type
of strategy and cognitive difficulty, where lying was easier for participants who used more
truthful events in their statement. Study 2 assessed the effects of two specific lying strategies on
perceptions of these statements: displacements (using verbatim) and novel lies (using gist).
Results found that displacement lies contained higher levels of detail and more cognitive
operations than novel lies. Study 3 then examined whether behavioral differences in the two
types of lies led to differences in deception detection rates, finding that lie accuracy was
significantly greater for novel lies than displacements. It appears that because displacements,
compared to novel lies, are more similar to truths (e.g., they rely on actual experiences and
require fewer cognitive resources), the cues displayed when using displacement make the
statement appear more like truths than novel lies. This in turn makes it more difficult to identify
displacements in comparison to novel lies.
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Chapter 1: General Introduction
Several theories have been developed to explain the various psychological processes that
differentiate lies and truths (Vrij, 2008). Research has attempted to link these processes to
behavioral cues that individuals are expected to exhibit when telling a lie (vs. a truth) and that, in
turn, might be used to discriminate between deceptive and truthful statements. Unfortunately,
research has found that such cues have relatively small and inconsistent effects on veracity
(DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, Muhlenbruck, Charlton, & Cooper, 2003). Furthermore, the
average individual detects deception with just slightly above chance accuracy (54%; Bond &
DePaulo, 2006). Thus, while psychological processes can explain why differences between liars
and truth tellers should emerge and facilitate detection, these predictions have not translated into
successful practice.
Two issues may account for this disconnect. First, while researchers have used various
psychological processes to explain differences between liars and truth tellers, another factor may
moderate this relationship–lying strategy. Second, while research has examined the role of
memory reconstruction processes in terms of practical implications for deception detection (e.g.,
creating tools for lie detectors to use), it has not sufficiently integrated this research with the
other deception theories to understand how memory processes mediate deception performance.
Dual process theories of memory suggest that people rely on two different sources of declarative
(conscious) memory–memory for events (episodic) and for facts and knowledge (semantic;
Tulving, 1984). Liars may rely strictly on one of these sources, or on a combination of both;
however, the role of memory processes on deception has not been fully explored. The current
research explores the explanatory role of strategies employed by liars and the impact of memory
reconstruction processes therein as factors that may inform research on deception.
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1.1

Lying
Lying, as defined by Vrij (2008), is “a successful or unsuccessful deliberate attempt,

without forewarning to create in another a belief which the communicator considers to be
untrue” (p. 15). Lies are told about thoughts, feelings, attitudes, and actions. While deception is
often considered to be a selfish and disruptive behavior (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, &
Epstein, 1996; Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006), it is commonplace in society. In fact, in
a study conducted by Hample (1980), three-fourths of participants claimed to have experienced a
situation that required lying. Studies using self-report methods such as journaling have found
that individuals tell at least one to two lies per day (DePaulo et al., 1996) and deceive in
approximately 25% of social interactions (Lippard, 1988).
While there appears to be a disconnect between the fact that lying is considered a socially
undesirable behavior yet it is routine practice, this can partially be explained by the wide range
of motivations for deception. One dimension of motivations that research has investigated
involves orientation of the lie towards one’s self versus others. Although the stereotypical view
of lying is that of a selfish act (Schweitzer et al., 2006), lies can also be told to benefit other
individuals (e.g., to protect a friend; Perkins and Turiel, 2007). In addition to this dimension,
Vrij (2008) discusses how lies can be told in order to gain an advantage or avoid a loss, as well
as for materialistic (e.g., to avoid a monetary penalty) versus psychological purposes (e.g., to
avoid embarrassment).
Just as motivations for deception vary, lies also range in the severity of consequences for
both the liar and the target of the lie. An individual might tell a minor lie in a social context with
no intention to harm (often referred to as a “white lie”). For example, a person might tell a
friend that an outfit looks attractive even when s/he believes otherwise. This type of lie is often
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told to spare hurt feelings rather than to harm anyone and is often perceived as having mild, if
any, consequences (Bussey, 1999). Lies can also be told in order to conceal a misdeed or
transgression. These lies are typically considered more severe than white lies (Bussey, 1999).
Lies of transgression told in social situations may or may not have significant consequences;
however, a domain that frequently encounters lies in a more serious form is the criminal justice
system. Individuals guilty of a transgression may lie in order to avoid suspicion for committing
that act. Innocent suspects may also lie to avoid unwarranted suspicion or to protect another
person. In the wake of the 9-11 terrorist attacks, researchers and practitioners have become
particularly interested in lies told in intelligence-gathering situations given the potential impact
of successful deceit on the lives of millions of people. Deceit encountered in this field ranges
from lies regarding transgressions, to affiliations (e.g., whether an individual is a part of a
particular organization), to knowledge (e.g., whether an individual possesses information about
an event or person). They can include lies about past activities or future plans (Granhag, 2004).
Deception in forensic and intelligence-gathering contexts often involves much greater
consequences than those of everyday, social lies. Deception in these contexts is therefore often
the focus of deception research.
1.2

Strategies of Lying
While many issues related to deception such as those discussed above have been

thoroughly explored in research, less is known about how people create lies. Granhag and
Stromwall (2004) noted that the research community has largely neglected strategies that are
invoked by liars. A small body of research has begun to examine this issue, typically by simply
asking participants to provide the general strategies they implemented while generating truthful
or deceptive statements. Primary strategies for liars include telling as much truth as possible
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(Hartwig et al., 2007), using real world components in their statements (Stromwall et al., 2007),
and keeping their stories simple (Stromwall et al., 2006).
In another self-report study of lying strategies, Lippard (1988) asked college students to
track all instances of deception that they used over a three-week period. He found six distinct
categories of deception: exaggerating, withholding information, telling half-truths/distorting,
lying (i.e., explicitly stated lying with commission), cheating, and stealing. The latter two
categories will not be discussed for the purposes of this research which is focused on lying, not
deception through actions only.
Exaggerating. Exaggeration is an intentional attempt to overstate the degree of truth in
order to create a belief in another individual that the communicator knows to be untrue (Lippard,
1988). Examples of exaggeration may include presenting oneself as more capable than is true in
a job interview or as more excited for an upcoming event than is actually the case.
Withholding information. People may also withhold portions of the truth from a
statement. These lies are often referred to as lies of omission (e.g., Van Swol, Braun, &
Malhotra, 2012). A teenager using this strategy may attempt to deceive his parents by being
forthcoming about his plans to go to the movies with friends, but exclude his plans to go to a
party afterwards.
Telling half-truths. Lippard’s (1988) conceptualization of half-truths involves providing
statements that contain a certain degree of truth, while altering some details to deceive. One way
that this can be accomplished is by interjecting truthful information from one context into the
context surrounding the lie. Malone, Adams, Anderson, Ansfield, and DePaulo (1997; as cited
in DePaulo et al., 2003) found this strategy to be the most frequently cited lying strategy used in
romantic relationships. Individuals based their lies on prior experiences, altering only what was
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necessary. Similarly, in a study of deception in the legal context, Wang, Chen, and Atabakhsh
(2004) found that criminals often alter only small portions of their identity. Bond and Speller
(2010) agreed that most people lie by interspersing deceptive statements with truth–an act the
researchers labeled “displacement.” These researchers highlighted three specific types of
displacement people can use: temporal, spatial, and affective displacement. A teenager may
temporally displace when asked by a parent what he did the previous night by recounting his
exact experiences from a different night. This same individual could alternatively spatially
displace by detailing his actions at one friend’s house as if they happened at a different friend’s
house. Affective displacement occurs when feelings for one person or situation are transposed
and applied to another person or situation. If someone who does not support Barack Obama is
asked how she feels about the President and wishes to appear supportive towards him, this
individual could take her positive feelings for someone she does endorse and apply them to
Obama.
Most recently, Leins, Fisher, and Ross (2012) interviewed participants with the intention
of investigating liars’ decision-making processes in greater detail than previous studies. They
asked participants to lie about a specific two-hour window of a particular evening. Interviewees
were free to adopt any strategy they felt appropriate in order to successfully deceive. Following
the lie, they were asked to explain their strategy in general and were then directly questioned as
to whether they used a previous experience for each major detail in their statement. In two
similar studies, the authors found that a majority of liars (67% and 86%) relied upon prior
experiences. Leins et al. (2012) concluded that because people use past experiences to lie,
purported indicators of deception that are based on memory processes that distinguish true
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experiences from imagined events may not be as useful for a majority of lies as literature had
indicated.
Lying (novel lies). Finally, individuals may choose to create an entirely novel lie. This
would involve fabricating details that have not actually happened in order to create a story. If
someone needs to lie about going to the ballet and has never been before, with no prior
experiences to use in order to displace, that person would likely need to fabricate a new story.
Critique of the literature. The literature concerning lying strategies is sparse.
Additionally, most of the studies that have examined these strategies have done so only in a
general sense, with surveys asking participants to freely report how they lie (e.g., Lippard, 1988;
Stromwall, Hartwig, Granhag, 2006). This method only allows for a general understanding of
strategic approaches to lying. This method has not allowed for a full understanding of strategies
and individuals’ motives behind choosing these strategies.
Although Bond and Speller (2010) did provide a more detailed taxonomy of lying
strategies, the categories they conceptualized (e.g., temporal, spatial, and affective
displacements) were based entirely upon speculation regarding the different ways liars could
displace, not on experimental or observational accounts. While these assumptions appear
sensible, it is imperative to have empirical support for these strategies. Another weakness of this
taxonomy is that novel lies may be more plausible than the authors indicated. If an individual
must lie about something that they have not experienced, they may be unable to use
displacement. In the example of the individual who has never been to the ballet, s/he is
unfamiliar with this context and will be unable to temporally displace, therefore requiring a new,
fabricated story. Furthermore, individuals may not have a strong memory of an experience to
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draw upon that fit the demands of the situation. In this case it may be easier for them to create a
novel story (albeit one still based on familiar situations).
Leins et al. (2012) attempted to fill this gap in research by using an interview to examine
lying strategies; however, their study did not solve the issue that plagued the self-report surveys
discussed above–lack of depth. After asking participants to report their general strategy, the
interviewers asked participants if they had ever previously experienced each detail that they
referred to in their lie. Results indicated that 67% of participants chose a strategy involving at
least one experienced event and 84% of all reported details were previously experienced. The
authors concluded that people rarely use conceptual knowledge in lies and instead rely on their
memories of prior experiences (i.e., displacement). However, it is plausible that this conclusion
is unjustified and a result of not probing participants’ responses deeply enough. Participants may
have used conceptual knowledge based on previous experiences, but reported to the researchers
that they used an actual prior experience. For example, if someone lied by saying that they had
eaten dinner with a friend, s/he may have reported this to researchers as a prior experience
despite using conceptual knowledge accumulated from several experiences of dinners with
friends. Even in the most in-depth study examining lying strategies, questions about this issue
remain unanswered.
Finally, no research investigating strategies of lies has attempted to integrate these
strategies with other theories of deception in order to understand exactly how strategies impact
both the act of deception and perceptions of the statement. The importance of integrating
deception theories with strategies will be discussed further below.
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1.3

Cues to Deception
One potential effect of using various strategies to lie is that these strategies will differ

with regard to their impact on content of the statement and behaviors of the liar. In order to
successfully distinguish between lies and truths, there must be detectable differences between
them. Observable differences in behaviors or impressions are referred to as “cues” to deception
or truthfulness. Researchers have thoroughly examined these cues and generally place them into
three categories: verbal, nonverbal, and vocal (DePaulo et al., 2003). Verbal cues are cues
derived from the actual content of the speaker’s statement (e.g., level of detail, admitted lack of
memory, negative statements). Nonverbal cues are those that can be observed solely from the
physical behavior of the speaker (e.g., eye contact, fidgeting, posture). Vocal cues involve
characteristics of speech (e.g., voice pitch, response latency).
Many studies have attempted to identify differences between lies and truths by recording
statements, coding them for selected cues, and comparing the two groups for the presence or
absence of those cues. Unfortunately, results across such studies are inconsistent (DePaulo et al,
2003). Nevertheless, research has developed a sufficient knowledge base to determine which
cues are and are not predictive of deception and truth.
Diagnostic versus non-diagnostic cues. A meta-analytic review conducted by DePaulo
and colleagues (2003) investigated 158 purported cues to deception or truthfulness from 120
independent samples. The general finding from this review was that there is no one, perfect cue
(or combination of cues) to deception that, through observation, can indicate with high accuracy
whether an individual is lying or telling the truth. While numerous cues are diagnostic of
differences between liars and truth tellers, these cues tend to have relatively small effect sizes.
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Whereas a commonly held belief is that nonverbal cues are most helpful in detecting
deception (Global Deception Team, 2006), DePaulo et al. (2003) determined that, in general,
these are the least reliable cues. Instead, verbal cues tend to be more diagnostic of deception. In
total, 20 significant cues were identified with effect sizes larger than d = .20. Just three of these
cues were nonverbal, three were vocal, and the remaining 14 were verbal. These findings have
led researchers to focus on the verbal content of deceptive and truthful statements rather than
nonverbal and vocal behaviors.
An individual’s knowledge of these cues (or lack thereof) has critical implications for
detecting deception. If the appropriate cues are attended to, detection should improve.
Numerous studies have attempted to train both lay persons and professionals on these cues in
order to improve detection accuracy (e.g., Vrij & Graham, 1997; DePaulo, Lassiter, & Stone,
1982; deTurck, 1991). Unfortunately, these studies have found limited improvements in
accuracy, in part due to the fact that the effect sizes associated with these cues are small (Hauch,
Sporer, Michael, & Meissner, 2010).
1.4

Theories of Deception
Researchers have developed and assessed multiple theories that use various psychological

processes to explain why cues differ between lies and truths. These theories are often
categorized into three types: affective, behavioral control, and cognitive complexity theories
(Vrij, 2008). While researchers acknowledge that no theory or process alone is likely to account
for all differences, little empirical research has investigated how these processes work
interdependently. Additionally, theoretical perspectives from a fourth body of research–memory
reconstruction–may help to explain differences between lies and truths. While deception
research has investigated issues related to memory processes, it has done so with a focus on
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practical implications by using this knowledge to create tools to improve deception detection.
Integrating memory-related processes with other psychological processes relevant to deception,
in light of divergent lying strategies, should provide a more comprehensive understanding of
deception.
Affective theory. Affective theory involves two components: emotional responses
related to the subject matter of a statement and arousal caused by actually providing that
statement. Ekman (1989) suggested that liars, compared to truth tellers, experience different
levels of certain emotions regarding their attitudes toward the issue or event in question. For
example, liars may feel guilt for a transgression they committed, whereas truth tellers should not
experience guilt when providing their account. Negative emotions such as guilt can result in
nonverbal behaviors related to withdrawal, and verbal behaviors such as negative statements and
statements that distance the liar from the content of the lie (Vrij, 2008). Zuckerman, DePaulo,
and Rosenthal (1980) suggested that, apart from emotions relevant to the lie, the act of lying
itself should lead liars to experience higher levels of psychological arousal. Liars may be fearful
of being caught or excited at the possibility of duping the target of the lie (Vrij, 2008). Greater
physiological arousal accompanying these emotions is predicted to result in increases in certain
nonverbal (e.g., blinking) and vocal behaviors (e.g., voice pitch).
Behavioral control theory. DePaulo (1992) asserted that liars and truth tellers have
much in common–both are concerned with the consequences of not being believed and will only
succeed if they present themselves as sincere. The distinction between these groups is that only
a truthful individual’s sincerity is genuine. While both could be aware that observers may
evaluate their words and behaviors in order to assess their credibility (Buller & Burgoon, 1996),
liars are generally more cognizant of their performance and impressions. This is because liars
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are less likely to take their credibility for granted (Kassin & Norwick, 2004). Therefore, more
often than truth tellers, liars will attempt to appear credible by controlling behavior (Buller &
Burgoon, 1996). While some behaviors are difficult to control (e.g., voice pitch), others are
easily manipulated (e.g., hand and arm movements, posture). As a result, attempted control of
some nonverbal behaviors may be fruitless (Ekman, 1989), but the resulting effect from
controllable cues may give statements a flat and monotonous appearance (DePaulo et al., 2003).
Attempting to control verbal behaviors in order to demonstrate credibility could result in less
detailed (less opportunities to be caught) and more consistent stories (Vrij, 2008).
Cognitive complexity theory. The cognitive complexity perspective rests on the finding
that lying requires more cognitive resources than telling the truth. Compared to truth tellers, liars
more often monitor their stories to ensure consistency (Vrij, 2008), monitor both their own and
the interviewer’s behaviors to appear credible (Buller & Burgoon, 1996), expend effort
suppressing the truth, and do not take their own credibility for granted (Kassin & Norwick,
2004). Each of these tasks requires cognitive resources. Vrij and colleagues (e.g., Vrij, Semin,
& Bull, 1996; Mann & Vrij, 2006; Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2006) have confirmed the notion
that lying is more cognitively demanding than telling the truth. Because of the cognitive effort
required to lie and the fact that humans have a limited supply of cognitive resources available at
any given time (Fitousi & Wenger, 2011), liars should have fewer resources to allocate towards
creating an involved, consistent, and believable lie. This could result in differences between liars
and truth tellers in speech content (e.g., level of detail) or memory failures. Additionally,
research in other domains has found that people performing high versus low cognitively
demanding tasks differ in nonverbal behavior (e.g., less blinking, fewer hand and arm
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movements, more gaze aversion; Bagley & Manelis, 1979; Ekman, 1997). Similar results could
be predicted for liars (high cognitive demand) and truth tellers (low cognitive demand).
Memory reconstruction processes. Although not traditionally discussed in this context,
dual process theories of memory that distinguish between episodic memory (memory for
personal experiences) and semantic memory (memory for facts, ideas, and concepts; Tulving,
1984) may have implications on differences between lies and truths. Whereas truths regarding
autobiographical events should rely extensively on episodic memory, lies of this nature may or
may not depend more on semantic memory. This issue will be discussed in greater detail below.
Information in semantic memory is often organized through schemas (mental frameworks
for organized knowledge; Bartlett, 1932). Of particular interest is the schematic representation
of a script–a structure that describes appropriate sequences of events in a particular context
(Hudson, 1992). An individual may have a script for a night at the bar and could use this
information to describe a typical evening in this context. The script may include props (e.g.,
tables and chairs, drinks, menus, etc.), players (e.g., employees and customers), scenes (e.g.,
ordering, drinking, conversations), and results (e.g., have fun, meet new people). Greater
experience in a particular situation leads to more elaborately developed schemas and scripts, and
quicker organization of statements (Pryor & Merluzzi, 1985).
One specific dual process theory of memory is fuzzy-trace theory (FTT), which models
the relationship between memory and higher-level reasoning (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002). This
theory distinguishes between two distinct forms of memory that are processed in parallel to each
other and are retrieved via dissociated pathways–gist and verbatim. Gist (a non-recollective
form of memory) involves understanding an event’s meanings, patterns, and relations, whereas
verbatim (a recollective form of memory) refers to vivid recall of the surface traits and
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contextual cues of an experience. While gist and verbatim are dissociated in both encoding and
retrieval stages, Brainerd and Reyna (1988) asserted that both can be held in working memory at
one time. Further, gist traces can vary in their level of abstraction from verbatim information
(Reyna & Brainerd, 1991). Brainerd and Reyna (1990) therefore proposed a fuzzy-to-verbatim
continuum that ranges from the most basic essence of encoded information to verbatim which
has preserved the exact perceptual details of this information. While humans may have access
to information at any point on this continuum, we prefer to rely on as much gist as possible for
tasks in large part because of the lower levels of processing complexity associated with these
traces (Brainerd and Reyna, 1990). For the purposes of the current research, certain lying
strategies will be referred to as relying upon either gist or verbatim, but it is important to note
that these strategies would be found on a continuum, either toward the verbatim or basic gist
ends.
FTT has been used in the study of false memories, finding that false memories often
appear from details that are consistent with the gist of an experience (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002).
For example, an individual might recall seeing the word “sleep” in a list of words that are
semantically related to sleep. False memories are more likely to occur when the gist of an event
is highly incorporated (Roediger & McDermott, 2000).
In related work, Johnson and Raye (1981) found that memories of past experiences differ
in quality from those of imagined events due to the fact that memories from experiences are
formed through perceptual processes (e.g., sensory and contextual information), whereas those
from imagined events are produced by cognitions (e.g., thoughts and reasoning). These
researchers found that memories based on actual experiences contain more sensory
characteristics, cognitive operations, and contextual attributions (time and place) than imagined
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events. This distinction relates to the dual process theory of memory as memories from past
experiences will likely rely heavily on episodic memories, while those of imagined events will
draw more from semantic memory. Johnson and Raye (1981) labeled the process by which
individuals attribute a memory to an experienced or imagined event Reality Monitoring (RM).
While initially used to help determine whether a memory was true or false, in recent
years researchers (e.g., Sporer, 1997; Sporer, 2004) have applied RM to the deception detection
domain, making the association that truths are memories of experienced events and lies are
comparable to imagined events. Sporer (1997) created a set of eight criteria on which to rate
deceptive and truthful statements: clarity, spatial information, temporal information, perceptual
information, reported affect for the event, realism, reconstructability of the story, and reported
cognitive operations at the time of the event. Truthful stories were expected to contain greater
levels of each of these criteria. Several studies have examined the effectiveness of using RM as
a tool for individuals to use in order to aid deception detection (e.g., Granhag, Stromwall, &
Landstrom, 2006; Sporer, 1997, Stromwall & Granhag, 2005). These studies found an average
truth accuracy rate of 72% and average lie accuracy rate of 66% (Vrij, 2008)–both well above
the 54% global accuracy rate found by Bond and DePaulo (2006).
Limitations of current theoretical approaches. Although the processes described above
make logical predictions about behavioral differences between liars and truth tellers, research has
identified a few noteworthy concerns. One problematic limitation is that the theories sometimes
offer opposing predictions (Vrij, 2008). For example, affective theories suggest a greater
number of body movements when lying, whereas behavioral control and cognitive complexity
theories predict that liars’ body movements should decrease. Another limitation specific to the
affective perspective is that the emotions predicted to occur as a result of deception can occur in
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the absence of deception. For example, a truthful individual may reasonably be just as fearful
about being judged as deceptive as a liar. A truthful individual experiencing guilt, fear, and/or
excitement could appear deceptive if the detector is relying on cues purported by the affective
theory.
Integrating psychological processes with strategies. As documented above, although
theories of deception have made reasonable predictions regarding expected differences between
lies and truths, studies examining cues to deception have found inconsistent and discouraging
results. A more sophisticated theoretical understanding of the relationship between lying
strategy and cues to deception may help explain these findings. Various lying strategies may be
differentially associated with the deception-related processes. These relationships could then
impact cues evinced by a liar.
For example, a few studies have found that lower levels of guilt accompany lies of
omission (withholding of information) versus those of commission (DePaulo et al., 2003). The
deceiver rationalizes a lie of omission with the fact that s/he did not explicitly lie to the target(s).
This difference in feelings of guilt between these lying strategies could in turn affect the cues
that are elicited, with individuals using lies of omission displaying fewer cues indicative of guilt
than those relying on lies of commission. Jung and Lee (2012) examined the impact of lie types
(e.g., memorized lies vs. self-created lies) on a physiological measure (i.e., alpha
desynchronization) of cognitive activity. They found that this measure could differentiate
between these types of lies, as well as the truth. These findings support the notion that
differences in lying strategies can result in varying reactions by the liar via cognitive and
emotional processes.
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For the purposes of the present research, differences between temporal displacements and
novel lies will be examined in relation to these processes. Just as lies of omission may reduce
levels of guilt, individuals telling displacements (compared to novel lies) may experience less
fear and excitement. Given that they are relying upon prior experiences, they may feel more
confident that their lies will be judged as credible, thus resulting in lower arousal levels.
Similarly, they may also feel less excited about potentially duping the interviewer if they believe
that it is less of a challenge to convince someone of a lie that is mostly true.
Lies require more cognitive effort than truths in part because liars must expend effort to
formulate their statements and keep the details consistent. This increased effort is not required of
truth tellers since they retrieve stories from memory and therefore generally have fewer problems
maintaining consistency. A similar pattern of differences in cognitive effort may exist between
novel lies and displacements. An individual who provides a displaced lie suggesting that s/he
did something that actually happened, just at a different time (who, where, and what are the
same, but the when is different), should expend less cognitive effort than someone who creates a
story in which details are fabricated and pieced together in a logical order.
Bond and Speller (2010) asserted that liars rely predominantly upon episodic memory
because displacements, which the researchers claim are used in a majority of lies, concern an
event that the liar actually experienced. One implication of this is that cues such as those used in
Reality Monitoring, which depend on lies being constructed from imagined experiences, may not
be as helpful as previously believed. However, novel lies may not be as difficult and uncommon
as Bond and Speller (2010) claimed. Someone with a particularly elaborate script may have little
trouble recounting a novel, deceptive story involving that script. As such, the notion that novel
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lies are much more difficult to create and tell, and therefore are rarely used may not be
completely justified.
While there is reason to expect that lying strategies could moderate the relationship
between psychological processes and perceptions of lies, further research is needed to understand
how these processes might be associated with different lying strategies and to assess how lying
strategies in turn impact the display of cues to deception and perceptions of veracity. Knowledge
of strategies that liars use and the best cues to focus on for each of these strategies would be
useful information for practitioners. Further, it may be possible to leverage this knowledge into
more effective investigative interviewing techniques.
1.5

Current Studies
The purpose of the current research was to gain greater insight into various lying

strategies, how these strategies relate to the psychological processes described above, and their
impact on cues to deception and deception detection. The few studies that have examined lying
strategies have failed to fully integrate them with existing theories of deception, or to thoroughly
understand their impact on subsequent perceptions of the lie. This goal was accomplished
through three related studies.
In order to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the strategies that people use
to lie, the decision process behind those strategies, and the role psychological processes play,
participants in Study 1 were recruited to undergo a Protocol Analysis and Cognitive Task
Analysis (explained below). Participants planned a deceptive statement about an
autobiographical event without restrictions on how to accomplish this. Half were then
systematically interviewed regarding their thought processes during the planning phase,
including the strategies they planned to enact in order to appear truthful. Other participants
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provided their statement and were then interviewed with a nearly identical set of questions about
this process. Of particular interest was the degree to which liars displaced and/or fabricated
novel stories. Other variables such as reliance upon semantic (gist) and episodic memory
(verbatim), affect, attempted behavioral control, and cognitive complexity, were probed as well.
In Study 2, a new group of participants told a truth and a lie using either displacement or novel
lying strategies. Recordings of these statements were then coded for diagnostic cues to
deception and truthfulness in order to examine potential differences between types of lies.
Finally, Study 3 explored similarities and differences in individuals’ abilities to detect these
types of lies with a third group of participants judging the veracities of these statements.
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Chapter 2: Lying Strategies and Their Impact on Psychological Processes (Study 1)
2.1

Introduction to Study 1
As previously noted, there is a shortage of research examining the strategies people use

when lying. While a few studies have assessed certain strategies in a very general sense
(Stromwall, Hartwig, Granhag, 2006; Stromwall, Granhag, & Langstrom, 2007; Hartwig,
Granhag, & Stromwall, 2007; Lippard, 1988), it would be beneficial to fully explore the act of
lying. The one known study (Leins et al., 2012) that examined strategy choice in an interview
context failed to do so with sufficient depth. A major weakness of this study was that
researchers concluded that participants used prior experiences (displacement) when lying and not
semantic memory, even though their interview questions likely did not successfully enabled
them to observe this distinction. This interview was limited to one open-ended question
regarding the strategies participants used and a follow up question for each major detail as to
whether they had experienced it before. Therefore, a study was needed to probe this process in
the detail and determine the extent to which individuals rely on verbatim versus gist traces of
experiences. In addition to better understanding these strategies, it is also important to know
how these strategies might influence psychological processes related to cues to deception (i.e.,
affective, cognitive complexity, behavioral control, and memory reconstruction), and to
determine how these processes work concurrently, as well as differentially as a function of lie
strategy. No known studies have investigated these relationships together.
Probing strategic decision making. Researchers have created systematic interviewing
methods to closely examine decision-making processes. The two methods that were used for the
present study included Protocol Analysis (PA; Ericsson & Simon, 1993) and Cognitive Task
Analysis (CTA; Crandall, Klein, and Hoffman, 2006). Both have been previously used across a
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multitude of disciplines (e.g., marketing research, system analysts, program managers, military
decision making; Crandall et al., 2006) and are often used in applied psychology to probe the
cognitions of experts in a particular domain. Experts are typically first confronted with a
situation that requires a decision to be made and are then observed and/or interviewed about their
decision process. There are benefits and costs associated with these methods and techniques
within each method. Decisions regarding the use of a particular method and technique are
typically made based on the specific interests of the research questions (Crandall et al., 2006).
The primary distinction between these two techniques is that PA uses undirected probe
questions that allow the interviewees to freely report their cognitive processes through real-time
and/or retrospective verbal reports. CTA, on the other hand, uses a structured interview where
specific prompts are directed toward key research questions. A limitation of directed interviews
is that considering a specific question may bias participants’ interpretations of their thought
processes (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). However, structured interviews can also provide a rich
source of data in comparison to PA.
A retrospective protocol is a specific technique that requires participants to think back
over a past experience and reflect on their thought processes. One common criticism of this
approach is that it assumes participants are both honest and aware of their cognitive operations,
which research has shown is not always the case (Crandall et al., 2006; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).
Additionally, if an individual is unaware that their cognitions will be probed, they may not
successfully encode this information. However, research has indicated that if cognitions are
recalled shortly after the related experience, information can have good reliability (Crandall et
al., 2006). In order to take advantage of the strengths of PA and CTA, both were used in the
study.
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2.2

Study 1 Methods
Participants. Thirty-six undergraduate students from the University of Texas at El Paso

(UTEP) were recruited to participate in this study from Introduction to Psychology courses.
Individuals participated in exchange for course credit. Four participants were excluded from
analyses. Three of these exclusions were due to low language proficiency resulting in
difficulties in understanding the task instructions and in communication throughout the
interview. The fourth exclusion involved a participant who was uncooperative, providing
minimal responses throughout the tasks. Therefore, the final analyses consisted of 32
interviewees (56.3% female and 78.1% Hispanic) with a mean age of 19.88.
Design. Interview timing was manipulated between-subjects as half of the participants
were interviewed immediately after the planning phase and half after providing the statement.
This manipulation was included due to findings in the PA and CTA literature that information
becomes less reliable over time. It may be difficult for participants to provide full and accurate
information regarding their thought processes during the planning phase when time has passed
and they have engaged in an activity that may have caused interference (i.e., providing the
statement). This distinction is particularly important given potential differences in the roles of
various processes at the planning versus providing stages. For example, individuals who
recently planned a statement may be more aware of processes related to memory reconstruction
as this phase requires them to think through their narrative. However, individuals who provided
the statement may be more cognizant of affective, behavioral control, and cognitive complexity
issues that may be more salient and impactful during this stage.
Materials. A set of interview questions was produced using Ericsson and Simon (1993)
and Crandall et al.’s (2006) recommended questions (see Appendix A). The questions were
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altered to fit the context of an interview regarding lying strategies, as well as to enable the
investigation of specific variables of interest (e.g., memory reconstruction, cognitive
complexity). Other than slight changes in the wording appropriate for participants in the plan
versus provide conditions, scripts for these conditions were kept consistent with one another in
order to collect comparable data.
Procedure. Upon arrival to the experiment, participants were greeted by a researcher and
provided informed consent. They were then randomly assigned to be interviewed following the
planning or providing stage and were given with instructions on how they should lie (see
Appendix B). Participants were instructed to create a deceptive account of their whereabouts for
the previous Friday evening from 6:00 pm to 11:00 pm that would convince an interviewer that
they were telling the truth. These instructions were created so that participants would be
unrestricted in their strategy choice. In addition, participants were given $5 and told that they
would be interviewed by an individual who had been trained to detect deception (i.e., a
confederate) and would not know whether their statement was truthful or deceptive. Participants
were told that if they were able to convince the interviewer that they were truthful, they would
keep the money. In reality, all participants were allowed to keep the money. The purpose of this
cover story was to create a more realistic scenario by increasing incentive and motivation for the
task. Studies with lower stakes and less experimental realism may risk not invoking affective,
behavioral control, and cognitive processes. Given that the intentions of the study were to
observe these processes, it was important to take considerable efforts to increase experimental
realism.
Following the instructions, participants were given five minutes to prepare their
statement, after which half of the participants were told that the true purpose of the study was to
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obtain a better understanding of their thoughts and feelings while planning the lie. This
information was not given to them beforehand to ensure that their thought processes were not
influenced by this knowledge. The other half of participants were interviewed by the
confederate beginning with the following statement: “Tell me everything that you can remember
about your whereabouts on Friday night between the hours of 6:00 and 11:00 pm.” All
interviews were video recorded. After the interview, participants in this condition were also told
the true purpose of the study.
Led by the researcher, the PA/CTA interview protocol began with unguided PA
questions. Individuals in the planning condition were asked to report everything that they
remembered thinking during this phase and those who provided their statement were interviewed
primarily about their experiences while actually providing the statement, but were allowed to
discuss experiences from the planning session as well.
Following the undirected PA section, individuals who provided the autobiographical
statement were shown the videotape of their statement. Participants were told that watching this
recording may trigger their memory for issues that they were thinking about and they should give
a ‘play by play’ summary of their thoughts and feelings while providing the statement. The
recording was paused each time participants spoke. If they did not spontaneously report their
thoughts regularly throughout the video, the researcher prompted them to provide introspection
at major shifts in the story.
Finally, all participants were interviewed using the scripted CTA questions. See
Appendix A for PA/CTA interview questions. Throughout these questions, participants were
also asked to respond to a series of Likert scale questions (on a 7-point scale) regarding their
perceptions of their emotions, task difficulty, impression management, use of gist versus
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verbatim, and comfort level with how they lied (see Appendix C). Each scaled question was
given to participants after their response to a corresponding question in the CTA interview. The
entire interview was audio-recorded. Interviews lasted between 15 and 32 minutes.
Coding. Based upon the research questions and trends observed in the interviews, a
coding scheme was developed to encompass a majority of the information that participants
provided. For example, when discussing their strategies, participants often mentioned attempting
to create either a complex or simple statement. Others mentioned using an event that was
familiar to them. See Appendix D for full coding scheme. Rather than creating categories of
responses for each question, themes were distilled from responses across the interview. For
instance, using a situation familiar to the participant could have been part of responses to a
number of questions and discussed in a variety of ways. The coding scheme merged all of these
responses together into one common theme. Coders also tracked whether responses were
discussed in the open-ended Protocol Analysis or closed-ended Cognitive Task Analysis
sections.
Interviews were coded by two independent coders. Once the coding scheme was initially
developed, they coded one interview together and discussed responses for each theme. The
coding scheme was then altered based on issues that arose from this discussion. Next, three
interviews were coded independently. Coders then compared responses for these interviews and
further refined the scheme based on disagreement or thoughts regarding potential future issues.
Finally, the coders independently coded the remaining videos and re-coded the first four
interviews using the finalized coding scheme.
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2.3

Study 1 Hypotheses
The primary research questions of interest involved the strategies that liars use and the

relationships between these strategies and various psychological processes. While, due to low
power, hypothesis testing was not used to analyze differences across conditions, several trends in
responses were expected.
Hypothesis 1. All participants were expected to report using (or planning to use)
strategies similar to those reported in previous studies–telling as much truth as possible, using
real world experiences, and keeping the story simple (e.g., Hartwig et al., 2007; Stromwall et al.,
2006; Stromwall et al., 2007).
Hypothesis 2. In response to CTA questions attempting to differentiate verbatim
(episodic memory) and gist (semantic memory), liars were expected to acknowledge relying
more heavily on gist than verbatim compared to the levels that some researchers have recently
suggested (e.g., Bond & Speller, 2010; Leins et al., 2012).
Hypothesis 3. Consistent with theories of deception, participants were expected to report
experiencing cognitive demand, affect (e.g., fear, guilt, and excitement), and efforts to control
their behavior in order to appear credible. However, given that truthful participants were not
interviewed, levels of these processes cannot be compared to a truthful baseline.
Hypothesis 4. Assuming that both novel lie and displacement strategies were reported,
participants who created novel lies were expected to report higher levels of cognitive demand
than those relying on displacement.
2.4

Study 1 Data Analysis
Percentages of participant responses in each category identified in the coding scheme

were calculated to examine trends in responding. It is important to note that reported
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percentages in certain categories do not necessarily imply that no other interviewees considered
that issue. It is possible (and likely in some situations) that more individuals considered some
issues than was actually reported in the interview. Furthermore, in certain themes, participants
could have responses placed in two seemingly opposing categories. For example, participants
might mention both trying to use a typical, everyday situation, but also report that they wanted to
make their story unique. Categories were not mutually exclusive. Therefore, some of the
percentages of responses for certain categories add up to greater than 100%.
2.5

Study 1 Results
Reliability. Reliability was calculated for all major coding themes using Cohen’s Kappa.

Using Fleiss’ (1981) guidelines for reliability, a majority of the themes achieved either fair-togood (.40-.79) or excellent reliability (.80-1.00). Poor agreement was found for “Chose strategy
because of believability by interviewer” (.218) and “Made it personal” (.310). Disagreements on
the former were caused by different interpretations of themes that were not resolved in the four
interviews coded together, but were easily resolved once coders agreed on definitions. “Made it
personal” and “Sound nice/innocent” (which achieved good reliability) themes both referred to
building rapport with the interviewer. When these similar categories were combined, good
reliability was attained. Disagreements for each theme were discussed until a mutual decision
was agreed upon by both raters. See Table 1 for reliability for all major categories in the coding
scheme
Responses. The primary variable of interest in this study was the strategies that
individuals used in order to lie. Specific questions investigated the extent to which participants
used (or planned to use) actual experiences (i.e., verbatim) versus memories distilled from
multiple previous experiences (i.e., gist). Use of actual experiences was considered a
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displacement and the use of conceptual knowledge a novel lie. In addition to reported memory
strategies, the coding scheme revealed themes regarding participant motivation, cognitive
complexity, impression management, and emotions. The sample quotations provided below
were chosen as prototypical responses for each theme.
As indicated above, CTA questions risk biasing responses. For example, an individual in
the planning session who had not previously considered controlling nonverbal behavior may
have indicated otherwise upon direct questioning, either due to the feeling that s/he should have
considered this strategy or that s/he actually would have if given the opportunity to provide a
statement. This concern is one reason that PA questions were used in the interview.
Additionally, before the interview, it was emphasized to participants that they should only report
what they actually thought and felt at the time, not what they believed the interviewer wanted to
hear. They were told that their credit was in no way impacted by their responses. Additionally,
following appropriate questions, participants in the planning condition were asked whether they
actually considered the issue at the time or simply believed that they would have if they had
provided the statement.
See Tables 2 through 8 for percentages of participants whose responses fit major themes.
These themes and associated percentages are discussed in further detail below.
Memory and narrative construction strategies. One focus of participants in responses to
both PA and CTA questioning involved how they created their story. See Table 2 for
percentages of responses related to each issue of memory and narrative construction that is
discussed below.
Simplicity versus complexity. Participants chose to use a variety of sometimes conflicting
strategies in creating the content of their statement. A majority (65.6%) believed it was best to
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create a complex, more detailed story, sometimes even creating evidence such as witnesses to
support it (31.3%). They wanted “a lie with a lot of substance” (Interviewee 25). As one
individual put it, “I started to make it more like complex so it would be more believable. So I just
kept adding and adding and adding” (Interviewee 7). The most frequently reported reason for
this strategy was to keep the story busy so that there was no room for other (deviant) activities
(25%).
Conversely, consistent with Stromwall et al. (2006), a significant proportion of the
participants also reported attempts to keep the story simple (34.4%). The primary reason for this
approach was that too much detail would seem made up (21.8%). For example, one individual
said that “If I do it too complex it’s going to be like if I’m lying or, you know, I think that
whenever someone says a lot of things and adds a lot of details it’s because they’re nervous and
want to make a point” (Interviewee 27). Another (Interviewee 34) reported that he “tried not to
give the exact time” for this same reason. A few interviewees took a middle ground, one
commenting that he wanted to make it “complex for the interviewer, but simple for me” to
remember (Interviewee 21) and another stating, “I wanted to be as detailed as possible, but not
overly detailed because nobody remembers exactly when and where and how something
happened. So I was going to give general statements like ‘I got to dinner around 6:20ish.’”
(Interviewee 11).
Typical versus unique. In another example of contrasting strategies, while a sizable
majority (84.4%) of individuals reported using (or planning to use) a familiar situation by
incorporating either typical events (68.8%) or the truth (75%) into their statements (consistent
with previous research; Hartwig et al., 2007; Stromwall et al., 2007), several interviewees
(18.8%) felt it important to create a unique story.
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Responses such as “everyone knows I do that sort of thing” (Interviewee 23) and
“something that more than likely would have happened on the weekend anyway” (Interviewee
32) referred to participants’ use of typical events. Interviewee 26, another individual who chose
to create a seemingly commonplace situation, said, “…the reason I picked it was because it was
pretty ideal. If I did pick a true scenario where I did something crazy, I would leave that out.”
Another stated, “You’re going to be like ‘oh’ well that makes sense. People do that. You know
everybody does that…That seems like a typical Friday night, what people would do. Nothing out
of the ordinary” (Interviewee 15). While participants frequently referred to everyday situations
with which they had personal experience, it was sometimes the case that they chose a story (or
detail) because it was something that the average person would do even if it was not an activity
that they engaged in themselves. For example, in referring to the part of her story where she
described ‘checking guys out’ in Barnes & Noble, Interviewee 15 explained, “I don’t really
check guys out, but that’s something that an average girl might do.”
Others took the use of a familiar situation a step further, claiming that they inserted truth
into their statements. They reported that they “formulated the story from past memories” and
tried to be “as truthful as possible, but still lie” (Interviewee 23). Interviewees reported using
this strategy because they “didn’t want to come up with an actual lie” (Interviewee 25), “it’s
more natural and believable because (they’ve) done it before”, “you’re not lying, you’re being
truthful” (Interviewee 2), and “it’s the truth so why wouldn’t they believe it?” (Interviewee 35).
However, some participants did choose to create stories that deviated from ordinary
events. For instance, Interviewee 8 used a story that “was kind of like an extravagant thing we
are going to do tonight”. Then in discussing why she chose something extravagant rather than
an everyday situation, she explained, “I thought that would be too normal.” Another said, “I was
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going to say something normal like some normal person would do on an average Friday night,
but I was like that was too obvious...It’s not as believable because everybody does that”
(Interviewee 25).
Gist versus verbatim. A majority of participants reported incorporating both familiar
things and truth into their stories. Further probing of their memories for the stories, revealed
that, as predicted, interviewees relied upon varying levels of gist and verbatim. A slight majority
(59.4%) reported using (or planning to use) primarily gist, with one-third of this group of
interviewees (21.9% total) relying (or planning to rely) on verbatim for small details or in
response to specific follow up questions. One interviewee in the latter group said “It’s definitely
a general storyline…You wanna leave room for, you know, like variability. You can add things
in there if you want to. I feel like if you give an exact experience that doesn’t leave room for
anything like that. So yeah, a general storyline is more appropriate for that I think.” However,
in talking about potential follow up questions, he went on to say: “I definitely would have used
some small details that I had experienced, but I don’t think that you could use a whole story that
was experienced” (Interviewee 13). Another, after providing a story using gist said that “if they
were to ask what I ordered at Olive Garden, that would be pretty easy. Just remember what I ate
last time” (Interviewee 21).
Although a majority of participants did rely primarily on gist, 18.8% reported using (or
planning to use) only verbatim and 21.9% used (or planned to use) gist for one or more major
parts to the story while relying on verbatim for other major part(s). An interviewee using
verbatim said, “That all happened once. That has happened to me before” (Interviewee 11).
Some made a conscious effort not to change a single detail because “that would mess (them) up”
(Interviewee 26). Someone using a combination said her story mostly used a “general
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storyline”, but also said that one significant portion of her story was verbatim: “When I went to
Craze, I remember what my friend got. I remember what I paid” (Interviewee 23).
Structure and sequence. Another major focus for many (62.5%) in creating these stories
was getting the timing and sequence of the story straight. Half (50.0%) of participants reported
wanting to fill-up the time frame as much as possible and 40.6% reported specific consideration
of story sequence and logical structure. Interviewee 15 stated that “Location and time were my
big things. Because I actually am familiar with the area, I know how much time it takes. So if
you do want to check up on that, ok, go ahead. You can do that.” Another interviewee (23) had
plans to “be more specific with hours if they don’t believe me.”
Once their story was devised, many interviewees (31.3%) reported wanting to stick
closely to this plan as a major focus of the task. However, several (21.8%) participants who
provided statements reported that they failed to tell the story as planned. In describing this, one
individual said her “thought process was, okay, I know what I want to say, but then when you
actually say it, I forgot this and this” (Interviewee 18).
Rationale behind strategies. In regards to the rationale behind their choices in strategies,
56.3% reported making decisions based specifically on perceived believability on the part of the
interviewer as opposed to how participants normally lie or the first thing to come to their mind
(43.8%). An example from this latter rationale came from Interviewee 2 who said “I just kinda
like grasped the fastest thing that I could make up and just used that. Like, I never second
guessed myself or said like what if I used this story or a different story. No, I just whatever
popped in my head first I just used that.” Those in the latter group may have been forced into
this choice by the task’s time constraints.
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Impression management. General impressions. Participants attempted to use a variety of
general and specific strategies in order to manage the impressions they left with the interviewer.
These responses can be viewed in Table 3. Many (40.6%) mentioned trying (or planning to try)
to appear natural, casual, and/or to treat the interviewer like a friend. Interviewee 15 stated, “I
wanted to make a tie to a friendship. And when you’re my friend, you’re more likely to believe
me,” and Interviewee 10 explained, “You don’t just tell strangers your whole lie. So if you put
yourself in the mentality like he’s just your friend, then things just come out more easily.”
Somewhat contrarily, 25% mentioned attempting (or planning to attempt) to hold a serious
demeanor. Interviewee 34 said that his goal was to “try to be serious. Like not laugh and just
take everything seriously” and later stated that he tried to make sure that he maintained this
appearance with his facial expressions. A slight majority (53.1%) discussed their (planned)
attempts to remain calm throughout the process. For instance, “I was thinking about how a
relaxed person would look” (Interviewee 31), and “I tried to keep, um, I guess my composure
‘cause if you’re gonna tell a lie then you need to be at ease. People who are lying tend not to
be” (Interviewee 11). Finally, 31.3% of individuals discussed (planned) efforts to build rapport
or trust with interviewers by exhibiting innocence and kindness in order to appear truthful. Some
sought to accomplish this through the details of the story: “I thought of an innocent thing –
babysitting my brothers. More childish, more good, like of a good person” (Interviewee 31).
Other times it was done through the interaction between interviewer and interviewee. One
person wondered, “if I’m friendly will they believe me more?” and said “I would try to be more
friendly and giggle and in my speech be more cutesy” (Interviewee 22). Another said, “I tried to
sound nice like a good girl so I wouldn’t seem guilty. So I smiled there and was like [twirls
hair]” (Interviewee 30).
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Behavioral control. Table 4 below provides percentages of participant responses related
to behavioral control. Consistent with research on individuals’ preconceptions of behavioral
cues, participants reported attempting (or planning to attempt) to control nonverbal cues (e.g.,
hand/arm movements, facial expressions, eye contact; 87.5%) to a greater extent than
verbal/vocal cues (e.g., contradictions, tone, fluency; 71.9%). A related finding to this focus on
nonverbal cues was that 34.4% of interviewees reported having accurate knowledge of which
cues (all nonverbal) they needed to control from television shows (e.g., Lie to Me) or other forms
of media. An interesting example of the focus on and misconceptions related to nonverbal cues
came from Interviewee 27 who said, “Well the verbal, I thought that I was going to be pretty
good, but it, but the nonverbal since you told me that the person had some classes on detecting
lies or something, I didn’t know if he was going to catch my eyes or something, my arms, my
fingers, my feet were moving a lot. I was quite a bit worried about my nonverbal behavior.”
While serious attempts were made by most interviewees to control these behaviors, 68.8% of
participants who provided statements still reported noticing that they were displaying a cue (e.g.,
eye contact, contradicted self, fidgeting) that they believed was indicative of deception.
Monitoring of interviewer. In addition to monitoring their own behavior, 65.6% of
individuals made (or planned) efforts to consider the interviewer’s behavior, such as questions
they might ask (37.5%) or facial expressions (34.4%). However, in order to prevent differential
treatment of interviewees which could potentially influence statements, the confederates were
instructed to be virtually nonreactive to participants. Out of the six participants in the ‘provide’
condition who said that they attempted to ‘read’ the interviewer, three reported giving up
because they were unsuccessful in gathering information from the interviewer’s reactions.
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Affect. Due to difficulties in assessing the degree of affect experienced by interviewees
using qualitative data, frequencies below are taken from participants who reported experiencing
any level of the emotions in question. Percentages of participants reported experiencing these
emotions can be seen in Table 5. Additionally, scaled questions examined in a later section help
quantify these emotions. Consistent with research on this theory, a large number of participants
reported experiencing nervousness and excitement; however, fewer interviewees reported any
level of guilt. Out of the 84.4% of interviewees reporting nervousness, 68.8% stated that this
feeling was due to the situation (e.g., uncertainty, being in a smaller room and interviewed by
someone whom they did not know), whereas just 28.1% felt nervous about potentially not being
believed. While 25% reported feeling guilty, another 21.9% also reported that they would have
felt guilty if the situation was real. Interestingly, two interviewees who relied on verbatim
reported not feeling guilty because they had experienced their the events from their story before.
One stated that she didn’t experience guilt “as much since I had experienced those events. It was
just on a different day” (Interviewee 3). Another said that she “felt little to none because it
happened…I felt guilty towards the end because I didn’t plan what I was saying. I was coming
up with things off the top of my head and from there on nothing I was saying was truthful”
(Interviewee 15). This participant inferred that she only started to feel guilty towards the end of
her statement because she began to provide details that had not happened before. Finally, a large
majority (81.3%) reported at least some level of excitement for the interviewer to believe them
(43.8%), for them to be a good liar (21.9%), and/or for extrinsic motivations (money; 15.6%).
Cognitive complexity. As with emotions, it was also difficult to measure level of task
difficulty using qualitative responses. Participants often (56.3%) reported at least a minimal
level of difficulty at some point during the task due to having to create details (37.5%), keep
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details straight (53.1%), get the timing straight (18.8%), or consider/answer follow-up questions
(18.8%). These responses can be seen in Table 6.
Reported relationships between theories. Strategies such as using the truth (associated
with verbatim) were perceived to be easier (62.5%), and similarly, more comfortable for
participants to use (40.6%) than alternatives. One individual commenting on the issue of
cognitive effort said that she chose the strategy because “using these two events that were true
would help make things easier…if you had asked me, um, who I was with or anything like that I
could provide truthful statements, so it was just easier” (Interviewee 16) and another that “If I
tell you the truth it’s going to be easier for me to remember everything” (Interviewee 27). In
discussing comfort, another interviewee (Interviewee 22) felt that using truthful events “was
about making (herself) feel comfortable in her lie” and that she “would get anxious if (she) had
to completely make it up.” Another said that she “included the part that was semi-true so that
way I feel more comfortable telling someone the truth rather than lying the entire time”
(Interviewee 18).
Motivation. A final theme that interviewees often referred to was related to their
motivations in performing this task. Percentages of responses related to this theme can be found
in Table 7. Overall, 84.4% appeared to generally care about successfully completing the task.
Extrinsic motivation in the form of money was mentioned by 34.4% of the participants, although
15.6% mentioned it in terms of cause for added excitement in completing the task. For example,
one individual stated “Well yeah, that would have been pretty cool because I would get five
dollars and that means it would have been a good lie…I felt it (excitement) at the time. I was
like ‘okay, this is a really solid lie.’” (Interviewee 25).

Only one person stated that they would

not have cared as much if not for the monetary incentive. Conversely, intrinsic motivation, from
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the desire to either test or prove their abilities to lie successfully, was explicitly mentioned by
37.5% of participants. Interviewee 27 was one such individual as he said “I always tell my
friends that I’m a good liar…So, like, alright if I can prove myself to be a good liar I can tell
them that.” Finally, 15.6% of individuals felt the desire to get the task over with as quickly as
possible. However, in every case, this desire was associated with nervousness or anxiety rather
than a complete lack of motivation. For example, “I had a more detailed story in my mind but
when I was telling it I just wanted to get it over with as soon as I could because I got really
uncomfortable” (Interviewee 2).
Attitudes toward lying. While CTA questions did not directly explore interviewees’
feelings on lying in general or their beliefs regarding their performance in this specific task,
many provided responses related to these issues. These findings are displayed in Table 8. In
reporting their feelings about lying, 15.6% of participants said that they did not like lying and
31.3% reported being poor liars. Those who did not like to lie made comments such as, “I get
uncomfortable when I lie,” (Interviewee 2) and “I know people know when I’m lying; I don’t
really like to lie” (Interviewee 18). Others (15.6%), though, were confident in their lying
abilities: “I have some experience acting and I’ve been able to tell lies before when I need to, so I
figured even if my story wasn’t well planned out, I still would be able to tell good lie given the
questions asked and stuff. So yeah, I have high confidence in my ability to tell a good lie”
(Interviewee 13). Of individuals who actually provided statements, 25% believed that they had
been successful after the interview and 25% believed that they had failed and would be judged
deceptive.
Responses to protocol analysis questions only. As discussed above, one advantage of
PA over CTA is that the latter risks influencing participants’ responses simply by referencing a

36

particular issue in a question. Therefore, while PA questions may have produced less overall
information than what was acquired from the CTA section, this information is more reliable.
However, it is also likely that participants waited until CTA questions to report some thoughts,
feelings, or motivations because they did not realize that it was important enough to mention in
the free recall.
In general, there were few differences in trends for responses to PA questions only versus
the entire interview. For example, similar to responses across both PA and CTA sections of the
interview, 62.5% of interviewees mentioned incorporating an everyday situation into their lies,
with 28.1% reporting the use of typical and familiar events and 40.6% reporting use of the truth.
The dilemma between complexity and simplicity was still apparent when looking at just PA
questions as 12.5% of individuals referred to each dimension. Issues related to timing were also
reported to be important for a sizable number of individuals (37.5%).
As far as managing impressions, interviewees still mentioned the desires to appear
credible and honest (43.8%) and calm (15.6%). One slight change in these trends was that
34.4% mentioned planning to control at least one nonverbal cue compared to 12.5% who planned
to control a verbal or vocal cue. This is a greater difference between the two than was the case
across the entire interview (87.5% vs. 71.9%).
When examining emotions, nervousness was reported in 68.8% of PA questions (vs.
84.4% total), while only two people mentioned guilt and none mentioned excitement in this
portion of the interview. Finally, in examining cognitive complexity theory, 15.6% of
participants freely recalled difficulty with at least one part of the task.
Key differences between plan and provide conditions. The results above discussed
trends in responses across plan and provide conditions. However, there were a few interesting
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differences in responses between each of these conditions. In general, it appears that their
strategy shifted when providing the statements (compared to planning) in order to make the task
easier. Providers reported using simpler statements and relying to a greater extent on familiar
events and the truth (i.e., verbatim). Due to small sample sizes, findings were reported when
differences in responses between groups was three or more interviews. These differences in
percentages can also be found in Table 9
Those who planned, but did not actually provide statements more often reported
attempting to create a complex statement (81.3%) than did those who provided statements
(50.0%). Providers, on the other hand, were more likely to report using everyday situations
(96.2%) than planners (75%). Planners used more gist than providers (75% vs. 50.0%), while
providers more often used a mix of both gist and verbatim (43.8% vs. 6.3%). Sticking to the
planned story was a focus of more participants in the providing condition (56.3%) compared to
the planning condition (6.3%); however, many providers (43.8%) reported being unsuccessful
with this goal because they failed to say everything that they had planned.
There were also a few differences related to the primary theories of deception.
‘Providing’ interviewees (81.3%) were more often concerned with controlling verbal cues than
‘planning’ interviewees (62.5%). In terms of emotions experienced, planners more often
reported being nervous (96.2% vs. 75% of providers), particularly about being judged as
deceptive (43.8% vs. 12.5%), and fearful (37.5% vs. 12.5%).
Scaled measures. The scaled measures were developed in order to supplement
qualitative measures. While the qualitative information provides a greater depth with which to
understand of lying, Likert scale questions succinctly describe participants’ emotions,
motivations, and cognitions throughout the task. Responses to these questions demonstrated

38

that these psychological processes were all engaged, to a certain degree, during the task.
Correlations between measures of these theories, as well as memory reconstructions, suggests
that these theories are interdependent.
All questions were measured on a 7-point Likert scale (see Appendix C). Participants
rated their excitement (M = 4.53, SD = 1.93), attempted behavioral control (M = 4.75, SD =
1.65), perceived cognitive complexity (M = 4.25, SD = 1.76), and comfort lying (M = 4.19, SD =
1.62) all significantly greater than the midpoint (i.e., 3.5), t’s(31) ≥ 2.382, p’s ≤ .024. They also
reported feeling less guilty (M = 2.63, SD = 1.45) than the midpoint, t(31) = -3.405, p = .002. No
other measures differed significantly from the midpoint (p’s > .05). See Table 10 for all scaled
measure means and standard deviations.
It would be reasonable to hypothesize that levels of emotion, impression management,
and cognitive complexity would increase when moving from planning to providing; however, ttests comparing responses from participants in these conditions only found differences in
excitement (Plan M = 5.31, SD = 1.78, Provide M = 3.75, SD = 1.81), t(30) = 2.47, p = .02, d =
.87, and comfort level (Plan M = 5.07, SD = 1.28, Provide M = 3.38, SD = 1.50), t(30) = 3.37, p
= .002, d = 1.21.
Examining correlations between these measures could provide interesting insight into
how the theories of deception (including memory reconstruction) and participant level of comfort
are interrelated. It is important to note that all correlations are exploratory and have low power.
They should only be used as support for other findings and as a tentative guide for future
research questions. Only significant correlations will be reported in this section (see Table 11 for
all correlations). The measure of gist versus verbatim was negatively correlated with reported
cognitive complexity (r = -.484), suggesting that the more verbatim that was included, the easier
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the task became. In terms of impression management, the degree to which participants
monitored the interviewer was positively correlated with both level of guilt (r = .409) and
cognitive complexity (r = .427), and was negatively correlated with participants’ comfort levels
with lying (r = -.502). Guilt was also positively associated with fear (r = .368) and negatively
associated with level of comfort in lying (r = -.386). Finally, cognitive complexity was
negatively correlated with level of comfort (r = -.437), indicating that the more difficult
participants perceived the task to be, the more uncomfortable participants were in completing the
task.
2.6

Study 1 Discussion
Participants in the current study showed significant insight into their thought processes

during the lying process. There are several examples throughout the interviews that highlight the
meta-cognitive skills participants used. One individual reported, “…if I said I went out with
some friends, that makes it seem like I could have committed a crime because friends when they
were together get into some mischief more than anything else, so I said I was with my girlfriend
so it was more believable” (Interviewee 13). This individual recounted carefully weighing the
benefits and consequences of perceived believability to determine exactly who he should include
in his statement. Another reported “I wanted to be as detailed as possible, but not overly
detailed because nobody remembers exactly when and where and how something happened. So I
was going to give general statements like I got to dinner around 6:20ish.’” (Interviewee 11).
This commitment that most participants displayed to the study provides credibility to the
conclusions drawn below.
Hypothesis 1. Somewhat consistent with Hypothesis 1, the results of Study 1 replicated
some previous findings on the strategies of liars. A considerable percentage tried to make the
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statements as truthful as possible (Hartwig et al., 2007) and incorporated real world situations
(Stromwall et al., 2007). In contrast to Stromwall et al. (2006), a greater number of participants
reported attempting to make their stories more complex rather than simpler. However, this
strategy of using a complex statement was less common for participants who actually provided
their statement (compared to reports from planners). When it came time to present their
statement, they appear to have attempted to simplify it. This is likely in part due to the findings
that some (15.6%) participants wanted to get the interview over with due to discomfort, while
others reported forgetting to say everything that they planned (21.8%).
Hypothesis 2. The results also provided support for Hypothesis 2. Leins et al. (2012) and
Bond and Speller (2010) contended that not only do individuals use as much truth as possible,
but in the context of an autobiographical account, they most often use an experience that has
happened before. While it appears that individuals do use familiar situations and frequently
report using truthful information, upon closer inspection, only 18.8% of participants primarily
relied on one or more exact experiences (verbatim) for their statements. Another 21.9% used
verbatim for some of the activities in the stories and gist for others. A majority (59.4%) of
individuals relied mainly on gist traces for their stories. When asked general questions regarding
their strategies, participants frequently responded that they incorporated actual experiences.
Other studies (e.g., Stromwall et al., 2007; Leins et al., 2012) stopped their analyses of strategies
at this point. However, upon more comprehensive questioning, it became clear that participants
were often not actually relying on vivid, episodic memories (i.e., verbatim). Instead they were
simply using scripts of events with which they were quite familiar. Therefore, concern from
Leins et al. (2012) regarding the utility of tools such as Reality Monitoring may be less
problematic than it appeared.
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While it may appear that use of verbatim would be most effective for liars, interviewees
suggested logical reasons for why creating a story with gist might be most beneficial.
Interviewee 13 wanted to leave his story open and be flexible in order to avoid being ‘boxed in’ a
lie during follow-up questioning. Then, if asked specifics, he said that he would rely on
verbatim so he could think quickly, and add logical and sufficient detail on the spot.
Additionally, individuals may not have (good) memories of an experience for every situation.
Situational constraints for a lie may not allow an individual to use a displacement strategy.
Novel lies could afford individuals more flexibility in comparison to displacements–something
that previous researchers did not consider when evaluating the use and value of novel lies.
An interesting yet perplexing finding regarding memory is that when comparing planners
to providers, planners were more likely to primarily rely on gist, whereas providers more often
used a mix of both gist and verbatim. It could be that as interviewees were put on the spot and
began to provide a statement, they reverted to using stories for which they have vivid memories
in order to make the task easier.
Hypothesis 3. While it is difficult to quantify the degree of success the study had in
invoking the processes outlined in the three main theories of deception, participants did report
the presence of these processes to a certain degree.
Impression management. Impression management was a strong focus for many
participants. They wanted to portray general impressions such as honesty, calmness, seriousness,
and friendliness/innocence. Friendliness and innocence were impressions not considered prior to
the study and do not appear to have been discussed or examined in the literature. These
impressions were not necessarily based upon the content of the lie, but rather were used in order
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to build rapport with the interviewer and make the interviewee appear like a person who would
not be deceptive.
Participants also made concerted efforts to leverage their understanding of deception
detection by attempting to control a variety of specific behaviors. For many, these attempts were
based on incorrect information acquired from television shows or other media sources. Not
surprisingly given research findings that the average person incorrectly believes many nonverbal
cues to be diagnostic of deceptions and does not tend to consider verbal cues, participants in this
study reported attempting to control nonverbal behaviors more frequently than verbal or vocal
behaviors. These differences increased when only examining responses to the more reliable,
unguided PA questions. Highlighting these misconceptions, one participant actually cited a
diagnostic verbal behavior but was incorrect in how it was related to deception. After
spontaneously correcting himself (a cue to truthfulness) in his statement, he said “but when I
came back (to correct himself), I was ahh, like, I guess I failed” (Interviewee 34). Conversely,
the finding that participants considered more verbal and vocal cues in the providing condition
than in the planning suggests that participants may indeed consider verbal cues nearly as often as
nonverbal, just at a later stage in the process.
A final way that interviewees attempted to (or planned to) manage their impressions was
by monitoring the interviewer. A majority of interviewees considered this in some fashion,
mainly by observing the interviewer’s facial expressions in order to to determine if s/he believed
their stories, or by considering what the follow up questions might be and how they might be
asked. For those who only planned the statements, it was difficult to explain exactly what
information they would look for and how they would use it to their advantage. A sizable
percentage of individuals who provided their statements reported that they were unsuccessful at

43

reading the interviewer’s reactions. A likely reason for this is that the confederate was instructed
to be unreactive so as not to influence the interviewees’ statements. While these instructions did
prevent participants from making use of the interviewer’s reactions, similarities may exist
between this situation and forensic contexts in which interviewers may likewise want to avoid
providing participants with such information.
These efforts by interviewees to influence the situation illustrate an often overlooked
phenomenon in the investigative interviewing literature. Interviewing techniques are focused on
how the interviewer can manipulate the situation in order to obtain the desired information.
However, it is clear that interviewees play an important role in this process. They are not simply
a static character that is under the influence of the interviewee; they play an active role in this
interaction.
Affect. A majority of participants experienced both nervousness and excitement. While
excitement was not mentioned in the more reliable PA section, it is plausible that this is because
participants did not consider this as an emotion when asked about their emotions in general.
When directly asked about it, most participants readily recounted their excitement in trying to
trick the interviewer and win the money. Guilt was only experienced by 25% of individuals and
for most of these interviewees the level of guilt appeared relatively low. One likely reason for
this finding is that while part of the guilt in liars is expected to stem from the act of lying,
another predicted cause of guilt is from the situation about which they are lying to conceal. For
instance, if someone is lying to cover up a crime they committed, affective theory predicts that
they will feel guilty for committing that crime (Ekman, 1989). However, participants in the
current study did not commit a transgression that would produce feelings of guilt. Interestingly,
according to both qualitative and quantitative analyses, participants who provided their
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statements were no more likely to be nervous than planners. In fact, planners mentioned being
nervous more often in the interviews than providers. Furthermore, a higher rate of these planners
reported that having to lie and potentially being judged as deceptive was a cause for this
nervousness. It may be that participants were more nervous when first confronted with the task
and the idea of an unknown interaction with the interviewer, but that they settled into the task
once they began providing their statements, and the nervousness was therefore alleviated and
sometimes forgotten.
Cognitive complexity. A majority of participants reported exerting cognitive effort at
some point during the task; however, as with the affective responses, it is difficult to determine
how this level of perceived difficulty compares to that of a real world situation. Participants
referred to some of the issues that research has demonstrated make lying more difficult than
telling the truth (Vrij, 2008): creating and keeping details of the story straight and consistent, and
monitoring the actions of the interviewer.
Hypothesis 4. One major purpose of the study was to investigate whether strategies such
as relying on gist versus verbatim would differentially influence theories of deception. The
strongest evidence for this can be found when examining gist and verbatim strategies alongside
perceptions of cognitive complexity. Many of the participants explained how using truthful
events made it easier to create and remember details (62.5%), and more comfortable (40.6%)
than alternatives. Additionally, when examining individuals who reported that the task was
somewhat difficult, 75% (compared to 62.5% overall) used gist. Only 12.5% (compared to
18.8% overall) of these individuals used verbatim. The significant correlation between perceived
cognitive complexity and level of gist versus verbatim supports this hypothesis as well. Given
the support in deception research for cognitive complexity theory over the affective and
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behavioral control theories, this relationship could have significant implications with regard to
cues displayed by liars and in turn, deception detection.
Other exploratory findings. A major goal of qualitative research is not only to use
findings as support for quantitative results in testing theories, but also to serve as a guide for
future research. Qualitative studies can often uncover relationships that may not have been
considered or examined otherwise. The current study discovered several trends that were not
related to primary objectives of the study, but could have important and interesting implications.
Variation in responses. In general, not only were there many misconceptions regarding
issues such as verbal and nonverbal behavior, but there also appears to be general disagreement
in terms of strategies to use when lying. One-third of participants reported that they wanted to
keep their stories simple, whereas two-thirds attempted to make them complex. A minority
(18.8%) reported trying to make their stories unique, while 84.4% chose to create statements
based on everyday/typical situations. As mentioned previously, a majority relied primarily on
gist, others on verbatim, and still others on a mix of the two. Twenty-five percent reported
attempting to maintain a serious mannerism and 40.6% treated the situation casually, as if the
interviewer was a friend.
Some of these issues are not mutually exclusive. As discussed above, some participants
mentioned wanting to make their statements detailed, but not too detailed. Other differences
might be matters of perspective. For example, an individual wanting to keep the story simple
might have a different perspective than someone reporting that they valued complexity, in terms
of the degree of detail required for a story to be considered simple versus complex. While their
intentions differ, these individuals might, in reality, create similarly detailed stories. However,
even with this caveat, it appears that there is significant disagreement as to the best way to
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formulate a deceitful autobiographical statement. Only one person explicitly said that they
“didn’t know how to formulate a believable lie” (Interviewee 22), and many professed that they
were good liars or knew how to lie from sources such as the media. Given the level of diversity
and misconceptions found in responses, it appears that fewer people should have been so
confident in their abilities.
Excusing lies. Responses regarding the motivations behind and benefit of using truthful
details in statements were striking to note as well. Using truth in their statements seemed to
make many participants feel like they were absolved of blame for lying. Two participants
explicitly stated that they felt less guilty because what they were saying was at least partially
true. One “felt little to none because it happened”, but then “felt guilty towards the end because
I didn’t plan what I was saying. I was coming up with things off the top of my head and from
there on nothing I was saying was truthful” (Interviewee 15). Many others made comments such
as “I didn’t want to come up with an actual lie” (Interviewee 25), “you’re not lying, you’re being
truthful” (Interviewee 2), and “that’s why I thought it was really honest” (Interviewee 35). It
appears that adding truthful details to statements made participants perceive their accounts as
less deceptive and therefore, less taboo. This may help to explain why people lie with regularity
even when lying is condemned by society. People can create statements that are not entirely
deceptive, and this relieves some of the responsibility they would otherwise feel for lying.
Experimental realism. One frequent criticism of deception research is that laboratory
settings do not closely enough mimic actual forensic contexts where participants would have
high motivations for lying and experience intense pressure while doing so. Therefore, lies may
differ significantly between the two settings. Based on responses, it appears that participants in
the present study were motivated to create successful deceptive statements. However, it is
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important to note that the motivations reported in the present research (e.g., to test/prove lying
abilities) may differ from those found in real life scenarios (e.g., to not to get caught). Therefore,
even if participants’ levels of motivation began to approach that of an individual in an actual
forensic or social setting, the difference in how they were motivated could result in divergent
behaviors. A slight majority of participants reported choosing strategies that they believed
would most likely lead them to be judged as credible, and a sizable percentage also reported
being intrinsically motivated to prove or test their abilities. All but one explicitly mentioned a
desire to be believed in their interview. While several did mention money as an extrinsically
motivating factor, typically this did not appear to be the primary motivation. Money as a
motivator was mentioned just once in the more reliable PA section, and only one interviewee
explicitly said that he would not have cared if it was not for the money. Additionally, as
indicated above, a vast majority of participants reported experiencing at least some level of
nervousness/anxiety and excitement in completing the task, with 25% reporting guilt. While the
degree to which they experienced these emotions may be less than a forensic interviewing
context, participants in the present study did feel the same emotions that would be expected in
the real world. Furthermore, in examining responses regarding nervousness, 68.8% of
participants reported being nervous about the situation of the interview rather than at the prospect
of lying or being judged a liar (28.1%). Given these results, it could be inferred that a majority
of truth tellers would also experience nervousness if they were in the same situation (i.e., being
interviewed by a stranger in a small room and uncertain of how the interview would unfold).
This finding supports a major criticism of the affective theory of deception–truth tellers can
experience similar emotions as liars. This becomes problematic given that it is extremely

48

difficult, if not impossible, to discern the difference between nervousness due to a situation
versus that caused by lying.
There were other interesting findings related to the time constraints of the task. Forty
percent of participants reported using the first strategy and story that they considered. Real
world situations would vary greatly in the time that individuals have to create truthful and
deceptive statements. If participants were given more time, it is possible that strategies may
have changed. On a related issue, half of participants who provided statements had the goal of
sticking closely to their story, but very few were able to accomplish this goal. Most of these
individuals noted leaving out some portion of their story. This may have been due in part to the
amount of preparation time participants were given. If they had more time to prepare and
practice their statement, they may have had fewer memory failures. Of course, if they had less
time to prepare a lie, as would sometimes be the case in forensic contexts, participants may not
have had time to come up with a strategy and statement, much less concern themselves with
‘sticking to the story’.
Relationships between theories. Finally, while the relationship between memory and
each of the primary theories of deception was of great interest in this study, it is also important to
understand how the primary theories are interrelated. It was difficult to extract relationships
using frequencies in the qualitative data; however, the exploratory correlations do indicate that
these theories are related. Higher levels of impression management (i.e., behavioral control)
appeared to make the task more difficult. Another form of impression management, monitoring
of the interviewer, was associated with greater levels of guilt. Both task difficulty and guilt were
in turn associated with level of comfort in lying. While these findings do not eliminate the
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limitations to affective and behavioral control theories, using these relationships to work toward
a more integrative approach should improve the overall understanding of deception.
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Chapter 3: Influences of Lying Strategy on Cues Evinced (Study 2)
3.1

Introduction to Study 2
While cues in deceptive versus truthful statements have garnered much interest in the

research, cue differences as a function of lie strategy have been virtually ignored. The findings
from Study 1, that psychological processes are differentially associated with various lying
strategies, could have considerable implications on cues to deception. Understanding the effects
of these relationships on cues to deception could be beneficial in research aimed at improving
deception detection abilities. Practitioners who have an idea of how someone may be lying
could rely more heavily on diagnostic cues related to that specific strategy. Alternatively, a
particular cue to deception may be an indication that an individual is using a particular strategy.
This knowledge could then allow investigators to focus their questioning techniques
appropriately.
Compared to lies of displacement, novel lies may be expected to contain higher levels of
cues related to gist traces and semantic memory, and greater cognitive demand. Additionally,
while it was difficult to extract associations between strategies and affective or behavioral
control theories in Study 1, differences in cues associated with these processes may be found
between these types of lies as well. If differences in cues between various lie strategies are
found, this may explain some of the inconsistent findings in the cue literature where a particular
cue is often found to be diagnostic of deception in one study but not in another. Those studies
may vary in terms of the situational demands of the lie and therefore result in unique patterns of
cues.
One of the few studies concerning linguistic differences between types of lies examined
outright lies, omissions, and truths (Van Swol, Braun, & Malhotra, 2012). Each participant in
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this study told an outright lie, a lie by omission, or the truth to a partner regarding an amount of
money s/he had been given to share with the partner. Partner interactions regarding the
allocation of money were transcribed and coded for linguistic cues. The researchers found that,
compared to individuals telling outright lies, those who deceived by omitting facts used fewer
overall words, words of causation, third-person pronouns, numbers, and profanity.
Bond and Speller (2010) conducted the one other known study examining cue variation
as a function of lie strategy. Participants, both felons and university students, first committed a
mock crime. They were then asked to provide a truthful statement, a completely fabricated
(novel) lie, a temporal displacement (i.e., describe what they had done earlier in the day for the
time period in question), and a spatial displacement (i.e., describe their actions but claim to have
been in a different location at the time of the crime). The participants also completed a mock job
interview in which they told the truth about their job history, fabricated their work history,
committed a temporal displacement (i.e., changed job timeline), and spatially displaced (i.e.,
changed locations of the jobs). Finally, to examine affective displacement, participants told the
truth and lied about their feelings toward a person they disliked.
Analysis of the above statements found the felon population to have a higher voice pitch
when affectively displacing compared to telling the truth. University students displayed a higher
voice pitch when fabricating a statement compared to temporally displacing, and both of these
strategies resulted in a higher pitch compared to when they told the truth. Verbal qualities of the
statements (RM cues) were analyzed as well, but no differences were found. Bond and Speller’s
(2010) conclusion was that displacements, specifically temporal displacements, are different
from novel lies, falling in between novel lies and truth on a perceived credibility scale.

52

There were, however, a few weaknesses to this study relevant to Study 2 of the current
research. First, it is not known how participants created these “complete fabrications.”
Participants each told a total of seven lies, but they were not debriefed regarding how they
formulated any of these statements, nor were their statements analyzed to examine this. There
was also no way of determining if participants actually followed the directions for each lie
strategy. For example, it is unknown whether or not some levels of displacements were used in
these lies. It is also not known if the displacements were complete displacements and that the
participants did not use any fabricated details.
Second, voice pitch and reality monitoring cues (see below) were the only cues analyzed.
While it was reasonable to hypothesize that these cues would differ among types of lies,
examining a wider range of diagnostic cues would help to determine exactly how, if at all, lying
strategies differ. Specifically, the present research examined cues associated with affective,
cognitive, and behavioral control perspectives, in addition to those related to memory
reconstruction (i.e., Reality Monitoring).
Diagnostic cues to deception. The present study analyzed cues to deception and truth
that have been identified in the literature as diagnostic cues, and that are supported by affective,
behavioral control, cognitive complexity, and memory reconstruction processes. For example,
while affective processes might suggest that lying would affect gaze aversion, because research
has determined that this cue is not indicative of deception, it was not included in this research.
DePaulo et al’s (2003) meta-analysis of the cue literature identified a number of
diagnostic cues that are associated with one or more of the theories of deception. Negativity and
nervousness are two cues that, according to affective processes, differ between liars and truth
tellers. Negativity is defined as the judge’s overall positive or negative impression of an
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interviewee’s verbal, nonverbal, and vocal cues. Nervousness refers to the overall impression
gained from verbal, nonverbal, and vocal cues regarding an individual’s comfort level..
Attempted behavioral control processes suggest differences in spontaneous corrections and
admitted lack of memory. A spontaneous correction occurs when a person corrects a detail in
his/her story without prompting from another individual while admitted lack of memory refers to
the act of simply admitting that one cannot remember a detail from the story. Finally, cognitive
complexity processes predict differences regarding how hard the interviewee appears to be
thinking, as well as logical structure (i.e., degree to which it is possible to reconstruct a statement
on the basis of the provided information) and plausibility (i.e., how realistic a story is).
Reality Monitoring also identified several cues that are related to memory reconstruction:
clarity/vividness, sensory information, spatial information, temporal information, logical
structure, plausibility and cognitive operations. Clarity/vividness refers to the degree to which a
statement is clear, sharp, and vivid as opposed to dim and vague. Sensory information involves
the presence of information such as sounds, smells, physical sensations, and visual details.
Spatial information criteria refer to information about locations or spatial arrangement of people
or objects, and temporal information includes details about when an event happened or
descriptions of a sequence of events. Finally, cognitive operations refer to inferences made by
the speaker at the time of the event.
Study 2 investigated cue differences between two types of lies that people can potentially
use. Participants were videotaped providing both truthful and deceptive (via one of two
strategies) statements regarding their whereabouts on a particular evening. Two coders were
then trained on the cues discussed above and coded both lies and truths for the presence or
absence of these cues.
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3.2

Study 2 Methods
Participants. Thirty-seven participants were recruited from Introduction to Psychology

courses at UTEP to provide truthful and deceptive autobiographical narratives. Twelve of these
participants were excluded due to manipulation check failures (i.e., participants failed to follow
the instructions regarding the specific way they were to lie). Five others were excluded due to an
extremely short truthful or deceptive statement (i.e., less than 45 seconds). This left 20 usable
pairs of statements from participants (75% female, 90% Hispanic, with a mean age of 24.5).
Design. The current study implemented a nested design. Veracity (truth vs. lie) was a
within-subjects variable as all participants provided both truthful and deceptive autobiographical
accounts. Lying strategy (temporal displacement vs. novel lie) was nested within the lie
condition of veracity. Half of the participants were assigned to use the displacement strategy for
their lie and half the novel strategy. After exclusions, there were ten participants in each
condition.
Materials.
Stimuli collection. A Canon Vixia HG21 HD Camcorder was used to record
autobiographical statements.
Cue rating tool. Scales of cues from RM (Sporer, 1997) and the Psychologically-based
Credibility Assessment Tool (PBCAT; Evans, Michael, Meissner, & Brandon, 2013) were
adapted to create a composite scale on which to rate each of the cues of interest. These cues
included: sensory details, spatial details, temporal details, admitted lack of memory, spontaneous
corrections, cognitive operations, clarity, plausibility, logical structure, cognitive effort,
negativity, and nervousness. See Appendix E for the RM and PBCAT measure and instructions,
and Figure 1 for cues predicted to differ between groups based on each deception theory. Both

55

RM and PBCAT scales are relatively straight forward, reliably coded, and have been validated in
prior research (Sporer, 1997; Evans, Michael, Meissner, & Brandon, 2013).
Procedure. Participants were greeted by a researcher and, after providing informed
consent, were randomly assigned to either the temporal displacement or the novel lie condition
as well as to an order in which to provide their statements (truth then lie, or lie then truth). They
were then provided with instructions appropriate for their condition (see Appendix F). Both
truthful and deceptive statements addressed the participants’ actions on a particular evening from
6:00 pm to 11:00 pm. Those in the novel lie condition were told to create a story that, while it
could involve events with which they were familiar, should not include any accounts that they
had exactly experienced before. Displacement participants were instructed to take one exact
experience from their memory to use for their autobiographical account and not to use any
details that they did not remember actually experiencing. As with Study 1, participants were
given $5 and told that their interviewer was trained in detecting deception and that s/he would
not know whether both statements were truthful, both deceptive, or one truthful and the other
deceptive. If participants were able to convince the interviewer that both statements were
truthful, they would keep the money. All participants kept the money at the conclusion of the
task.
In order to minimize differences among participants in terms of the length of delay
between the nights in question and the day of the interview, stimuli were collected on Monday
and Tuesday. Individuals participating on Monday provided statements regarding Thursday and
Friday evenings, and those participating on Tuesday did so for Friday and Saturday evenings.
Participants were given five minutes to prepare their statement and were then interviewed
on camera beginning with the question: “Tell me everything that you can remember about your
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whereabouts on Thursday/Friday/Saturday night between the hours of 6:00 and 11:00 pm.”
After providing the lie (or truth), this procedure was repeated for the truth (or lie). Following
both statements, individuals were debriefed to ensure that they had properly followed the
statement instructions (i.e., appropriately used displacement or novel lies to lie and told the truth
in the truthful statement). Questions 19-23 from the CTA interview questions in Study 1 (see
Appendix A) were used for this debriefing. If an individual did not properly follow instructions,
they were excluded from the stimulus set. After participation, individuals were debriefed,
thanked, and given research credit.
Coding of cues. Autobiographical statements were coded for the presence of cues in
deception and truth. Two independent coders were trained on the cues included in the measure.
For RM cues, they read Sporer (1997), Vrij (2008; pp. 261-279), Masip et al. (2005), Vrij et al.
(2004), and Sporer (2004). Additionally, coders read the training materials that explained the
cues and their relation to truth or deception and were provided instructions on using the rating
system (see Appendix E). They coded all statements for these cues blind to experimental
condition (truth vs. displacement vs. novel lies).
3.3

Study 2 Hypothesis
It was hypothesized that truthful statements would contain the highest levels of cues to

truthfulness (i.e., sensory details, temporal details, spatial details, admitted lack of memory,
spontaneous corrections, cognitive operations, clarity, plausibility, and logical structure) and
lowest levels of cues to deception (i.e., thought hard, negativity, and nervousness), followed by
lies of displacement, and finally, novel lies.
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3.4

Study 2 Data Analysis
First, given that the goal of the present study is to examine differences between lies by

forcing participants into a particular lying strategy, it was important to see if there were
differences between types of lies in terms of how comfortable participants felt lying. If
differences in comfort were found, it would be possible that cues differences found between
statements were based on participants’ comfort and ability to use the particular strategy, rather
than theoretical differences between the lies. Therefore, a t-test compared participants’ reported
comfort levels in lying. Next, a series of multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA) was
conducted to test whether statement veracity of lying strategy affected the ratings of the cues.
Only reliable cues were included in the analyses.
3.5

Study 2 Results
Reliability. Inter-rater reliability was calculated using Cohen’s Kappa for details,

admitted lack of memory, spontaneous corrections, and cognitive operations and correlations
were examined for the remaining cues. Examination of reliability using Cohen’s Kappa revealed
fair to good reliability for each cue except spatial details (Fleiss, 1981). None of the correlations
were significant. See Table 12 for reliabilities. There are a few potential factors that may have
impacted reliability. First, given that there were only 40 videos, insufficient power was likely
one limitation to these ratings. Second, five out of the six cues that had a more objective rating
system were found to be significant. These cues had specific criteria for a rating in each of the
three options. Conversely, none of the more subjective cues (e.g., clarity, negativity) which were
rated on 9-point Likert scales attained sufficient reliability. These subjective cues are likely
inherently more difficult to reliably code than cues that can be objectively measured. Coders’
ratings were then averaged to obtain one rating for each cue.
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Cue differences between strategies. The t-test comparing participants’ level of comfort
using each strategy was conducted. Comfort level did not significantly differ between strategy
(Displacement M = 3.80, SD = .68; Novel Lie M = 4.30, SD = 1.89), t(18) = 0.55, p = .587.
Due to poor reliability for seven of the 12 cues and the fact that these same cues tended to
demonstrate high collinearity, only effects of sensory details, temporal details, admitted lack of
memory, spontaneous corrections, and cognitive operations were examined in these analyses.
Additionally, averages of sensory and temporal detail ratings were summed to provide an overall
measure of detail.
Given the manipulation of lies, not truths, if differences in cues should emerge between
groups, they would be expected to be found between lies. Between- and within-subject
MANOVAs were used in order to see if lie condition had an effect on cue ratings. As expected,
one-way between-subject MANOVAs indicated a non-significant effect between truths, F(4, 15)
= .37, p = .826, Wilks’ Λ = .91, partial η2 = .09 but a significant multivariate effect for lies, F(4,
15) = 4.74, p = .011, Wilks’ Λ = .44, partial η2 = .56. Follow-up univariate tests revealed
significant effects for cognitive operations, F(1, 18) = 6.52, p = .020, partial η2 = .27, and details,
F(1, 18) = 5.41, p = .032, partial η2 = .23. See Table 13 for cue means. The directions of these
effects were consistent with predictions. Just as truthful individuals tend to display greater levels
of cognitive operations and details than liars, liars in the displacement condition were rated as
having higher levels of these cues (Cognitive operations: M = .550, SD = .41; Details: M = 2.25,
SD = .82) than those in the novel lie condition (Cognitive operations: M = .050, SD = .16;
Details: M = 1.4, SD = .81).
Repeated measures MANOVAs to investigate differences in veracity on these cues for
each strategy condition revealed a non-significant difference for the displacement condition, F(4,
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6) = 2.23, p = .182, Wilks’ Λ = .40, partial η2 = .60. Truths and displacements did not differ on
these cues. There was a marginally significant effect between lies and truths in the novel lie
condition, F(4, 6) = 3.32, p = .093, Wilks’ Λ = .33, partial η2 = .69.
3.6

Study 2 Discussion
As expected, truths did not differ between conditions in terms of the cues interviewees

displayed on any of the analyses conducted. This demonstrates that telling a displacement versus
novel lie did not influence how people provided their truthful statement. In comparing cues
displayed in each type of lie, individuals in the displacement condition provided significantly
more details and cognitive operations. Both of these findings are consistent with hypotheses
based on cognitive complexity theory and reality monitoring. Higher levels of these cues would
be expected in statements that were easier to create and relied heavily on the truth (i.e.,
displacements). While an individual who makes up a story (i.e., novel lie) may be able to create
a plausible and logical story, it would likely be difficult for that person to generate a level of
detail equivalent to that of an individual who actually experienced an event (i.e., displacement).
Additionally, creating references to thought processes may not be something that people consider
when fabricating a novel lie. However, discussing thought processes at the time of the story as
individuals recount an actual experience may be more natural.
There are a few potential causes for the limited findings in Study 2. First, the poor
reliability attained for the subjective cues meant that potential differences on these cues could not
be analyzed. Second, the study was severely underpowered. A majority of the cues examined
with the measure used had small to medium associated effect sizes (.2 > d > .42). However, only
20 truths and 20 lies (10/condition) were examined. A study either examining more stimuli with
two coders or using a larger number of raters with the same amount of stimuli could solve this

60

problem. Third, it is possible that there were other differences between these lies that the
measure in the current study did not address. Given the differences that were found and these
possible factors listed above, it is still plausible that there would be noticeable differences
between displacements and novel lies that could influence the lies’ detection rates.
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Chapter 4: Influences of Lying Strategy on Deception Detection Performance (Study 3)
4.1

Introduction to Study 3
Research has observed improvements in deception detection abilities when individuals

pay attention to diagnostic cues to deception (e.g., DePaulo, Rosenthal, & Zuckerman, 1980;
Hauch et al., 2010). While the hypotheses for Study 2 were not all supported, given the caveats
discussed above, it is plausible that these novel lies and displacements differ and that these
differences may affect individuals’ deception detection abilities.
Deception detection should be more difficult in situations where cues to deception are
less frequent and less amplified (i.e., displacements) than those eliciting more frequent and
stronger cues (i.e., novel lies). Moreover, if a detector focuses on the cues surrounding the
truthful portion of a displaced lie (e.g., what a person did for dinner), neglecting those from the
deceptive part (e.g., when they actually went to dinner), the statement should be more likely to
be judged as truthful (Vrij, 2008). Given the effects of strategy on evinced cues, individuals
should be able to better discriminate between novel lies and truths than displacements and truths.
Deception detection. Considering its potential implications, particularly in law
enforcement and national security contexts, successful assessment of credibility would be a
useful skill to possess. In contrast to the shortage of research examining strategies and decisionmaking processes of liars, decisions of lie detectors have been studied in greater depth.
Unfortunately, this research has consistently and overwhelmingly found that deception detection
is a task at which humans are not particularly adept.
A meta-analysis by Bond and DePaulo (2006) determined that, on average, humans
detect deception with approximately 54% accuracy (only slightly greater than chance
performance). Furthermore, individuals are more accurate in detecting truth (61%) than
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deception (47%). This can partially be explained by a tendency of the lay person to trust that
others are telling the truth (known as a truth bias). Meissner and Kassin (2002) found that
experienced and trained individuals, such as law enforcement officials, are no more accurate than
lay persons in detecting deception, but that they do exhibit a lie bias (a tendency to judge
statements as deceptive) in comparison to the average individual’s truth bias.
Given the fact that the choice of lying strategy has received little attention in research to
date, it is not surprising that there is also very limited research examining differences in
deception detection ability for different lying strategies. In the only known study to investigate
this, Vrij and Baxter (1999) compared elaborations (extensive statements) to denials (limited
verbal information), finding no differences in overall lie detection accuracy. They did, however,
discover a truth bias for elaborations and a lie bias for denials.
Study 3 sought to determine whether differences in detectability existed between
displacements and novel lies. Participants viewed the same videotaped statements from Study 2.
They then made veracity judgments for each statement and indicated which cues (from those
examined in Study 2) were most useful in their decisions.
4.2

Study 3 Methods
Participants. A power analysis with an estimated effect size of d = .4 (Bond & DePaulo,

2006), power = .80, and α = .05 suggested that 156 participants were needed to detect a
difference in accuracy between these types of lies if a difference existed. This effect size is a
conservative estimate compared to that found in a meta-analysis of detection accuracy (Bond &
DePaulo, 2006). This conservative estimate was used because the current study compared two
types of lies, which should be more similar than a truth and a lie. One hundred and sixty
participants (Age M = 20.67, SD = 4.73) were recruited to participate in the study from
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Introduction to Psychology courses at UTEP. The sample consisted of 63.8% females and
81.3% Hispanics.
Design. Study 3 implemented the same design as Study 1. Lying strategy (temporal
displacement vs. novel lie) was nested within veracity (truth vs. lie). All participants watched
both truthful and deceptive videos. Half of these participants watched displaced lies, whereas
half viewed novel lies.
Materials. The 40 usable autobiographical statements (20 lies and 20 truths) were
divided into four groups. For the displacement condition, each individual’s lie and truth were
separated and five lies were grouped with five truths. This was repeated for the novel lie
condition. The result was four sets of ten videos each, with two sets containing displacements
and two containing novel lies. No set of videos had a deceptive and truthful statement from the
same participant. Video orders were randomized and counterbalanced to control for order
effects. A 32-inch television was used to display the videotaped statements.
Procedure. Upon arrival, participants provided informed consent and completed a
demographics questionnaire. They were then seated in front of a television and presented with a
set of ten videos. Following each video, they answered a series of three questions. First, “Do
you believe that this individual was lying or telling the truth?” (Response: lie vs. truth). Second,
on an 11-point Likert scale, “How confident are you that your response to the question above is
actually correct?” (0%: not confident at all, a complete guess; 100%: I am absolutely positive in
my judgment). Third, on an 11-point Likert scale, “What percentage of the statement do you
believe was deceptive?” (0%: the statement was not deceptive at all; 100%: the statement was
completely deceptive). Given that the present research views lies and truths on a continuum
rather than a dichotomy, the percentage deceptive measure is more relevant to the task than a
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measure that forces participants into a binary decision. Use of a continuous measure such as this
has not been reported in any known previous deception studies. Participants were also asked to
report if they knew any of the interviewees; however, judgments of these cases were included in
the analysis because in all eleven cases the interviewee was just familiar to the participant, not a
friend. After making judgments on all ten videos, participants rated their reliance on each of the
cues from those examined in Study 2 to determine if untrained individuals could determine any
cue differences. In addition to the scale (see Appendix G), participants were given definitions
and examples for each cue. Finally, individuals were debriefed, thanked for their participation,
and given research credit.
4.3

Study 3 Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1. Because the strategy manipulation (displacement vs. novel lie) was nested

within the lie, differences between strategy conditions were expected for lie, not truth, accuracy.
Novel lies were hypothesized to be identified more accurately than displacements.
Hypothesis 2. It was also predicted that perceived differences between truths and novel
lies on the question “What percentage of the statement do you believe was deceptive?” would be
greater than between truths and displacements. In essence, on a continuum, displacements would
appear more like truths than novel lies.
4.4

Study 3 Data Analysis
Given that the experimental manipulation was expected to only affect on lie, not truth,

accuracy, the recommended technique of using signal detection theory estimates to analyze
accuracy in deception judgments (Meissner and Kassin, 2002) was not relevant for the present
study. These estimates would only be important to use when hits (i.e., lies correctly identified as
lies) and false alarms (i.e., truths incorrectly classified as lies) may differ. In the case of the
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current study only hits would be expected to be influenced by the manipulation. Therefore,
accuracy rates for both lies and truths were averaged for each participant for analysis.
Percentage deception and confidence ratings were also averaged for lies and truths. A series of 2
(Veracity: Truth vs. Lie) x 2 (Lie condition: displacement vs. novel lie) ANOVAs was then used
to examine the effect of these conditions on both dependent variables. Simple effects were then
examined for any significant interaction. T-tests were then used to compare individuals in the
displacement and novel lie conditions on their reliance upon the cues examined in Study 2.
4.5

Study 3 Results
Analysis of accuracy revealed a main effect for veracity, F(1, 158) = 97.46, p < .001, η p 2

= .38, but no main effect for lie condition, F(1, 158) = 1.79, p = .183, η p 2 = .01. A significant
interaction qualified these results, F(1, 158) = 4.58, p < .034, η p 2 = .03. Simple effects revealed
higher truth than lie accuracy in both the novel lie condition (Truth Accuracy: M = .610, SD =
.21; Lie Accuracy: M = .400, SD = .25), t(158) = 5.483, p < .001, d = .91, and displacement
condition (Truth Accuracy: M = .638, SD = .21; Lie Accuracy: M = .311, SD = .22), t(158) =
8.471, p < .001, d = 1.52. These findings demonstrate a truth bias that is often found in samples
with little experience or training in detecting deception. Additionally, as would be expected,
since instructions for the truths were identical for each condition, there was no significant effect
between novel lies and displacements, t(158) = 0.810, p = .419, d = .13, on truth accuracy.
However, a significant difference was found for lie accuracy in that novel lies were more
accurately identified than displacements, t(158) = 2.398, p = .018, d = .38. See Figure 2 for
accuracy rates.
The ANOVA for the percentage deceptive measure found a significant main effect for
veracity, F(1, 156) = 6.84, p = .010, η p 2 = .04, where lies were rated as containing a greater
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percentage of deception (M = 35.5, SD = 22.0) than truths (M = 30.8, SD = 15.0), and a
significant main effect for lie condition, F(1, 156) = 5.63, p = .019, η p 2 = .04, with statements in
the novel lie condition being rated as more deceptive (M = 36.0, SE = 1.7) than those in the
displacement condition (M = 30.3, SE = 1.7). The interaction was not significant, F(1, 158) =
97.46, p = .349, η p 2 = .01. However, given that the predictions for the current study involved
differences in lie accuracy only, follow up tests examined differences between conditions in lie
and truth accuracy. As expected, tests revealed no significant difference for truthful statements
(Percentage Deceptive in Novel condition: M = 3.283, SD = 1.38; Percentage Deceptive in
Displacement condition: M = 2.882, SD = 1.59), t(156) = 1.691, p = .093, d = .27, but found that
novel lies were rated more deceptive (M = 3.907, SD = 2.50) than displacements M = 3.182, SD =
1.75), t(156) = 2.112, p = .036, d = .34. See Figure 3 for percentage deception ratings.

No significant differences were found for between-group or within-subjects tests on
participants’ confidence ratings (p’s > .05). See Figure 4 for confidence estimates.
There were no specific hypotheses regarding differences between novel and displacement
conditions on cues that participants relied upon in making their judgments given that participants
had not been exposed to these cues until after all judgments were made. Furthermore, apart from
findings in Study 2 regarding level of detail and cognitive operations, coders who were actually
trained to use these cues were not particularly successful at differentiating between novel lies and
displacements. Nonetheless, it is important to know if participants relied more on certain cues
when exposed to novel lies versus displacements. T-tests found no significant differences
between groups (p’s > .05). See Table 14 for means and standard deviations for each cue.
4.6

Study 3 Discussion
As noted above, because instructions for truths were identical for each lying strategy

condition, perceptions of truths were not expected to differ between conditions. The non67

significant findings of truth accuracy for novel lie versus displacements supports this notion. If a
difference on this test had been found, it would suggest that the act of telling one lie or the other
first (as half of the participants did) changed the way that participants told the truth. As
predicted, significant differences for both accuracy and the percentage deceptive measure were
found when comparing the lies in each condition. Participants were able to identify novel lies
more often than displacements and also rated these lies as appearing more deceptive than
displacements. The within-subjects comparisons on the percentage deceptive measure showed
that participants successfully distinguished between lies and truths for novel lies, but not
displacements. Finally, while the significant main effect of veracity also illustrates the truth bias
in that, consistent with previous research, participants had a propensity to judge statements as
truthful (i.e., truth bias).
While Study 2 did not find as many differences in behavioral cues as expected, Study 3
showed that participants were able to perceive either the differences that were found (i.e., level
of detail and cognitive operations), or differences in cues that Study 2 did not investigate. As
expected, novel lies were easier to identify than displacements. This is likely due to the fact that
displacements, which contain higher levels of truth than novel lies, contain fewer cues to
deception (more details and cognitive operations), making them appear more like truths.
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Chapter 5: General Discussion
The purpose of the current research was to gain a better understanding of the strategies
individuals use to lie, the relationships between these strategies and psychological processes
underlying deception, and the implications of these interactions on perceptions of deceptive
statements. Taken together, the results of the three studies indicate that people do use various
strategies to lie, and that these strategies can affect both perceptions of behavioral cues and
detectability of lies.
Study 1 demonstrated that people use a wide variety of strategies in creating deceptive
statements. One major strategic focus of participants involved using familiar details in their
statement. However, the degree of familiarity (i.e., an actual experience/verbatim vs. gist) varied
among participants. While previous researchers (e.g., Leins et al., 2012; Bond & Speller, 2008)
suggested that individuals frequently use exact experiences in their lies, the focused questioning
in Study 1 revealed that a majority of participants still used non-recollective (i.e., gist) rather
than recollective memory (i.e., verbatim). Two frequently reported benefits of relying on
familiar situations were that they made lies easier to create and helped participants feel more
comfortable telling them. Although individuals referred to this advantage regardless of their use
of gist versus verbatim, the negative correlation between the use of verbatim and cognitive
complexity suggests that the more a story relies on truth (not merely familiar details), the easier
lying becomes.
While there was no baseline group (truth tellers) to compare liars to in order to validate
the primary theories of deception, interviewees did report emotions, behaviors, and cognitions
related to these theories. More importantly, interview responses illustrated relationships among
these theories. For example, as participants put forth greater efforts to control their behavior,
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lying became more difficult, and these individuals felt more guilty. In the first part of this
relationship, putting forth efforts to control their behaviors may have the indirect effect of
evincing reliable cues to deception that are associated with cognitive complexity. Vrij, Mann,
Leal, and Fisher (2010) took advantage of this relationship by requiring participants to maintain
eye contact with interviewers (behavioral control) as a way of increasing cognitive load. This
manipulation improved detection accuracy. However, in part due to the promise of cognitive
complexity theory approaches to deception, recent research has been dismissive of affective and
behavioral control theories. It is important not to ignore these latter two theories and their
relationships with each other, as well as with cognitive complexity theory.
Study 1 also revealed interesting findings that were unrelated to the primary research
questions. For example, whereas research has examined impression management while lying in
terms of specific behavioral cues, participants indicated considerable focus on general
impressions such as calmness, seriousness, friendliness, and innocence. These impressions could
have a significant impact on the dynamics of an interaction. If participants’ justification in using
these strategies is correct, these impressions could increase the likelihood of a statement being
judged truthful. Furthermore, much of the research on behavioral cues has examined their utility
in actually distinguishing between lies and truths. Research has attended less to the impact that
these cues and general impression management strategies have on interactions with, and
perceptions of judges.
Another interesting finding was that many participants made reference to the fact that
basing their lies on the truth seemed to alleviate some of the responsibility associated with
deception. Only two of these comments were made when specifically addressing the issue of
guilt; however, this could be a subject worthy of further investigation. Individuals who use
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displacement strategies may feel less guilty about their lies, approaching the level of guilt felt by
truthful individuals. This decrease in feelings of accountability for lies that incorporated the
truth could help to explain the motivations for and propensity of deceptive behavior found in the
real world. People seem more willing to lie when they can include more truthful information in
their statements.
Study 2 examined truths and two types of lies that interviewees reported using in Study 1.
While results did not support the hypotheses that these lies would differ on many of the cues that
the literature has found to be diagnostic of deception, there were a few differences between these
conditions in terms of cues evinced. Liars using displacements provided more details and
cognitive operations than those telling novel lies. These results supported predictions based on
both cognitive complexity theory and memory construction. Because participants in Study 1
who relied on truthful details (i.e., displacement strategies) reported lower task difficulty than
those who did not use an actual experience (i.e., novel lie strategies), cognitive complexity
theory suggests that these individuals should display more cues related to truthfulness (e.g., level
of detail) than novel liars. Similarly, reality monitoring suggests that statements based on actual
experiences will contain more details and references to cognitive operations than those based on
imagined events (Sporer, 1997). Since verbatim is a memory of an actual experience, it makes
sense that these statements would include greater levels of detail and cognitive operations.
Study 3 then demonstrated that, perhaps partly due to these differences in cues, lying
strategy can affect detection abilities. Displacements, which rely on verbatim, appeared less
deceptive, and were significantly more difficult to identify than novel lies relying on gist.
DePaulo, Rosenthal, and Zuckerman (1980) found that accuracy improves when participants pay
attention to diagnostic cues. Since both level of detail and cognitive operations have been found
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to be indicators of truthfulness, participants assessing credibility in the displacement condition
would have fewer diagnostic cues to attend to than those in the novel lie condition, thus making
it a more difficult task.
Considered as a whole, these studies show that liars take a variety of approaches in order
to successfully deceive. These approaches can result in differences in terms of cues displayed
and, in turn, affect the decisions of judges. One common approach, which previous research has
referred to (e.g., Stromwall et al., 2004) is that individual use familiar experiences in their
stories. These familiar experiences can make it easier for individuals to create and provide lies,
particularly when the experience is something that has actually happened. While Studies 2 and 3
only explored lying strategies differentiate by level of gist and verbatim, other strategies,
including some discussed in Study 1, could have similar effects on speaker behavior. It is clear
that lies should not be viewed in the overly simplistic manner with which much past research has
tended to use.
5.1

Practical Implications
The results from the three current studies have significant implications for deception

detection in contexts such as the criminal justice system. First, it is important to understand that
people do lie in different ways. The fact that lies are often combined into one category in
research may be one reason for the variation and inconsistency in findings regarding cues to
deception. If the type of lie an individual uses can be identified, it may be possible to determine
the most important cues to which a detector should attend during deception detection tasks.
While it would be difficult to discern specific strategies used in every lying situation,
through certain interviewing techniques, it may be possible to either determine a likely
implemented strategy or develop a set of techniques that together could more effectively identify
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a wider range of lies. For example, questions focused on cognitive operations of senders at the
time of the story may be particularly helpful in identifying novel lies, whereas questions intended
to detect temporal displacements could focus on the extent to which the suspect’s story matches
the timeline of the period in question (since these displacements require that participants fit an
already existing memory around a specific time frame).
Another questioning technique that could be particularly effective for displacements is
the Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE) technique (Hartwig, Granhag, Stromwall, & Kronkvist;
2006). This interviewing method forces suspects to provide a statement before strategically
introducing evidence throughout the interview that the suspect is then required to account for in
his/her statement. As one individual from Study 1 who used gist framed it, “You wanna leave
room for, you know, like variability. You can add things in there if you want to. I feel like if you
give an exact experience that doesn’t leave room for anything like that. So yeah, a general
storyline is more appropriate for that I think.” Depending on the details provided in
displacements, these lies may be less flexible once told and it could therefore be easier for
participants to get trapped into a lie when confronted with a technique such as SUE.
While there may be ways to improve detectability of each type of lie, it may also be
possible to conduct interviews in a manner that will compel individuals to use more a novel
approach to lying rather than displacement. Future research could investigate this possibility.
5.2

Limitations
While this research supports the ideas that 1) people use multiple techniques to lie about

autobiographical accounts, and 2) differences in these strategies can lead to differences in
perceptions of the lies, there are a few important caveats that should be noted.
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First, Study 1 classified these strategies by reliance on gist, verbatim, or ‘half and half’.
Studies 2 and 3 then forced participants to use only complete gist or complete verbatim. Perhaps
the most important finding from Study 1 was that there is a wide spectrum of lying strategies that
individuals use. Nearly half (46.9%) of participants in Study 1 used a mix (classified as either
‘half and half’ or ‘gist with verbatim for small details’) of gist and verbatim. However, as
discussed above, information in working memory exists on a fuzzy-to-verbatim continuum
(Brainerd & Reyna, 1990). Therefore, dichotomizing this variable for the purpose of a
manipulation is overly simplistic, but also necessary first step in this research.
Another limitation to the present research relates to the applicability of displacements in
the way that they were manipulated in Studies 2 and 3. Apart from having to report information
from a single past experience, participants in the displacement condition were unrestricted in the
way that they could lie. They could draw from any experience they chose. As a result, some
may have used experiences that, had there been an opportunity to investigate their stories (as is
frequently the case in forensic or general social contexts) might have been easy to disprove. For
example, it could be easy to disprove the statement of a displacement participant who recounted
a story about a large party with many witnesses. While a similar argument could be made for the
novel lie condition, this factor may differentially influence the two types of lies because novel
lies, compared to displacements, may be more flexible. Novel liars may find it relatively easy to
piece together stories that would be difficult to disprove. Conversely, those using
displacements may have greater difficulty thinking of actual previous experiences that would
survive further investigation. Individuals’ memories for events that contain no disprovable facts
may offer fewer vivid details and therefore, would appear less truthful. A related issue is that
individuals may simply either not have a memory to draw on to fit every particular situation, or
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may only have a memory from the distant past. In the latter scenario, individuals may have
forgotten many details of the experience, which Study 2 suggested was a differentiating factor
for displacement versus novel lies. Research finding faster rates of forgetting for verbatim,
compared to gist traces (Brainerd, Reyna, Kneer, 1995; Gernsbacher, 1985) suggests that the
temporal effects on memory accessibility would be an important factor in both choice and
effectiveness of a novel lie versus displacement strategy. For all of these reasons, the fact that
participants in the displacement condition were not as limited in their choices as is likely the case
in the real world may have resulted in an underestimation of lie accuracy.
Finally, a frequent criticism of much of the deception research is that laboratory
simulations do not closely enough mimic real world circumstances. In the present studies the use
of a confederate interviewer appeared to successfully increase the arousal level of participants
and they appeared to take the task seriously. A majority of participants reported feeling nervous
and excited during the task. They also appeared to be sufficiently motivated based upon
responses detailing their thought processes while planning or providing the statement (Study 1).
While conditions still may not have reached the extent of an actual police interview, the above
measures that were taken clearly improved the external validity of the research.
5.3

Future Research
While many people lie with relative regularity, great variability exists in the abilities of

liars (Vrij, Granhag, & Mann, 2010). Therefore, many of the participants in Study 1 may have
been poor liars. In fact, nearly one-third of participants in Study 1 confessed that they did not
believe they were good liars. It would be interesting to perform this same interview with a
sample of expert liars (such as criminals who are often considered experts; Bond & Lee, 2005) in
order to discover strategies that the most effective liars use. Since these are the people that
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detectors most struggle to identify, knowledge of their strategies would be particularly beneficial.
Research across a variety of domains has found differences between experts and novices on
information processing and decision making. For example, compared to novices, experts use
more intuition-based strategies and declarative knowledge in decision making than novices
(Ericsson, 2006). Spreading activation principles also suggest that experts, who have more
developed networks and patterns to hold their knowledge, can more easily draw connections and
patterns from information in order to make decisions more effectively (Feltovich, Prietula, &
Ericsson, 2006).
As discussed above, the present research is just one early step in examining differences
between lies. While it compared two different types of lies, further work is needed to examine
the middle ground of these lies where people use either multiple verbatim experiences or a mix
of gist and verbatim (in the middle of the fuzzy-to-verbatim continuum).
Certain situation factors may also influence both the strategy chosen and effectiveness of
that strategy. In addition to the potential temporal effects of memory accessibility discussed
above, strategy might depend on factors such as the context or target of the lie (e.g., interviewer).
For example, someone may choose to use gist traces in a social lie where there is likely a lower
chance of someone carefully scrutinizing the statement as would be the case in a forensic
context. One strategy may also be more attractive than the other depending on if the target of the
lie is someone that the liar either does or does not know well.
There are also other dimensions on which lies can differ. For example, there was
disagreement among participants in terms of the level of complexity that a lie should contain, as
well as how mundane versus extravagant the events surrounding a story should be. Further,
lying via omission is another lying strategy that research has identified. These are lies grounded
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in an actual experience and could be formed from any point on the fuzzy-to-verbatim continuum
depending on how the information was processed and retrieved. It’s categorization as a lie rests
in the fact that the liar is attempting to give the target an impression that is untrue by omitting a
crucial piece (or pieces) of information. Finally, although this study’s aim was to investigate lies
regarding autobiographical statements, people can also lie about beliefs, attitudes, and emotions.
Rather than combine all of these lies, exploration of strategies within each type of deception, and
the effects therein, could greatly advance the field.
Findings regarding the influence that interviewees attempt to exert through impression
management during questioning has not been thoroughly studied. Some of these attempts, such
as maintaining an appearance of innocence, seem to have been overlooked in research. Future
research could investigate specific impression management strategies used by certain types of
people or particular impressions individuals attempt to make in various situations. It would also
be useful to determine what impact, if any, these efforts by interviewees have on the interviewer
and subsequent interactions. For example, research could investigate if behaving casually and
treating the interviewer like a friend makes a person’s story appear more or less credible than one
who displays a serious demeanor.
The purpose of Study 1 was to gain greater insight into the lying process, while Studies 2
and 3 sought to determine if different approaches to lying (gist vs. verbatim memory in this case)
led to differences in perceptions of these statements. It is important to obtain a comprehensive
understanding of the variety of ways that people choose to lie and how these lies impact cues
evinced and detection of deception. Once the behaviors, cognitions, emotions, goals, and
motivations of liars, as well as their impact, are better understood, research focusing on
deception detecting and investigative interviewing can be most effective.
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Tables
Table 1
Study 1 Inter-rater Reliability (Cohen’s Kappa)
Cue

Kappa

Cue

Extrinsic motivation

.873

Unique situation

.613

Intrinsic motivation

.410

Everyday situation

.711

Appear truthful

.734

Make it personal

.310

Sound nice/innocent

.671

Timing of story

.602

Appear natural/casual

.887

Something logical

.529

Stay calm

.814

Influence of
strategy

.592

Chose strategy because of
believability

.218

Gist

.741

Delivery of story

.625

Verbatim

.796

Nonverbal cues (Yes)

.871

Half and half

.697

Nonverbal cues (No)

.890

Verbatim only for
small details

.904

Verbal cues (Yes)

.655

Nervous

.784

Verbal cues (No)

.904

Fear

.760

Realized they were
displaying a cue

**

Guilt

.818

Did things because of
knowledge of lying

.778

Excitement

.714

Simple/complex

.540

Difficulty

.429

**one coder did not code ‘yes’ for any interview and Kappa could therefore not be calculated
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Table 2
Study 1 Frequencies of Memory and Narrative Construction Strategies
Theme

%

Complex story

65.6

Simple story

34.4

Mix (complex and simple story)

21.9

Fabricated evidence

31.3

Too much detail would seem made up

21.8

Everyday situation

84.4

Familiar/typical events

68.8

Truth

75.0

Unique situation

18.8

Gist

59.4

Verbatim

18.8

Half and half

21.9

Get timing straight

62.5

Stick to story

31.3

Forgot details that were planned

21.8

Chose strategy for believability

56.3

First thing to mind

43.8
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Table 3
Study 1 Frequencies of Impression Management: General Impressions
Theme

%

Appear casual

40.6

Appear serious

25.0

Remain calm

53.1

Appear Innocent/friendly

31.3

Table 4
Study 1 Frequencies of Behavioral Control
Cue

%

Legs/feet

9.4

Posture

9.5

Facial expressions

31.3

Arms/hands

46.9

Eye movement

50.0

Eye contact

40.6

Breathing

9.4

Contradictions

21.9

Speech fluency

34.4

Voice clarity

37.5

Ums/uhs

18.8

Tone

21.9

Rate of speech

15.6
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Table 5
Study 1 Frequencies of Affect
Theme

%

Nervousness

84.4

Nervousness due to situation

68.8

Nervousness about lying

28.1

Guilt

25.0

Excitement

81.3

Excited for interviewer to believe

43.8

Excited for money

15.6

Excited for self

21.9

Table 6
Study 1 Frequencies of Cognitive Complexity
Theme

%

Required at least minimal
difficulty

56.3

To create details

37.5

To keep details straight

53.1

Timing events in story

18.8

Follow up questions

18.8
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Table 7
Study 1 Frequencies of Motivation
Theme

%

Generally cared about the task

84.4

Extrinsic motivation

34.4

Intrinsic motivation

37.5

Get task over with quickly

15.6

Table 8
Study 1 Frequencies of Attitudes toward lying
Theme

%

Don’t like lying

15.6

Bad liar

31.3

Good liar

15.6

Unsuccessfully lied (provide only)

25.0

Successfully lied (provide only)

25.0
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Table 9
Study 1 Differences in Responses between Plan Versus Provide Conditions
Plan condition (%)
Provide condition (%)
Cue
Complex

81.3

50.0

Everyday situation

75.0

96.2

Gist

75.0

50.0

Mix of gist and verbatim

6.3

43.8

Stick to the planned story

6.3

56.3

Behavioral control (verbal)

62.5

81.3

Nervous

96.2

75.0

Nervous about being
judged deceptive

43.8

12.5

Fearful

37.5

12.5

Table 10
Study 1 Scaled Measure Descriptive Statistics (7-point Likert scales)
Measure

M (SD)

Gist (1) vs. verbatim (7)

3.72 (1.59)

Guilt

2.63 (1.45)

Fear

3.44 (1.70)

Excitement

4.53 (1.93)**

Behavioral control

4.75 (1.65)***

Cognitive complexity

4.25 (1.76)*

Monitoring of interviewer

3.58 (1.89)

Comfort lying

4.19 (1.62)*

* p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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Table 11
Study 1 Scaled Measure Correlations
Guilt

Fear

Excitement

Control

Monitor

Cognitive
Complexity

Comfort

Gist/Verbatim

-.033

.249

-.065

.009

-.224

-.484***

.188

Guilt

–

.368**

.085

.283

.566***

.409**

-.386**

Fear

–

–

.270

.109

.070

.129

.060

Excitement

–

–

–

.225

-.015

.206

.315*

Control

–

–

–

–

.333*

.160

-.055

Monitor

–

–

–

–

–

.427**

-.502***

Cognitive
Complexity

–

–

–

–

–

–

-.437**

* p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01
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Table 12
Study 2 Interrater Reliability
Cue

Reliability

Sensory details

κ = .580

Spatial details

κ = .054

Temporal details

κ = .587

Admitted lack of memory

κ = .513

Spontaneous corrections

κ = .636

Cognitive operations

κ = .500

Clarity

r = .146

Plausibility

r = .149

Logical structure

r = .191

Nervousness

r = .238

Negativity

r = .012

Table 13
Study 2 Average Cue Ratings for Type of Lie MANOVA
Cue

Novel M (SD)

Displacement M (SD)

Details

1.40 (.81)

2.25 (.82)

Admitted Lack of Memory

0.30 (.42)

0.30 (.26)

Spontaneous Corrections

0.50 (.41)

0.60 (.70)

Cognitive Operations

0.55 (.60)

0.05 (.16)
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Table 14
Study 3 Judge Perceptions of Cues
Cue

Novel M (SD)

Displacement M (SD)

Sensory details

5.40 (1.37)

5.43 (1.12)

Spatial details

4.38 (1.33)

4.71 (1.42)

Temporal details

5.05 (1.48)

5.23 (1.40)

Admitted lack of memory

3.53 (1.33)

3.41 (1.28)

Spontaneous corrections

3.31 (1.26)

3.16 (1.13)

Cognitive operations

3.18 (1.06)

2.96 (1.23)

Clarity

5.74 (1.01)

5.50 (1.04)

Plausibility

5.31 (1.06)

5.55 (1.08)

Logical structure

5.18 (1.19)

5.39 (1.29)

Nervousness

4.29 (1.70)

4.52 (1.45)

Negativity

2.76 (1.28)

2.91 (1.34)
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Figures

Truths vs. Lies
Cognitive complexity
• Level of detail
• Logical Structure
• Plausibility
• Cognitive effort

Affective
• Negativity
• Nervousness

Behavioral Control
• Spontaneous corrections
• Admitted lack of memory
Memory reconstruction
• Clarity
• Level of detail
• Cognitive operations

Figure 1: Cues to deception predicted to differ between groups based on theories of deception
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Figure 2: Mean accuracies for truths (averaged), novel lie, and displacement
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Figure 3: Mean ‘percent deceptive’ percentages of truth (averaged), novel lie, and displacement
accuracies
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Figure 4: Mean confidence ratings for truths, displacements, and novel lies
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Appendix A: Protocol Analysis and Cognitive Task Analysis Questions
Condition 1: Participants who planned their statement
PA undirected probe
1) “I am going to ask you to think aloud. This may be new and unfamiliar to you, but please
know that there are no wrong answers, so you should not guess. I am only interested in
knowing what is going through your mind. Your thoughts will help us learn about how
individuals formulate autobiographical statements. Feel free to say anything that you’re
thinking. I want you to close your eyes and think back to your planning session to
provide your account. Take as much time as you would like to think about this time. As
you are doing this, tell me out loud any thoughts that come to mind. Try to be as
complete as possible.”
2) “Is that all? Okay, that was great. Now, people often provide additional information
when repeating their thought processes for a second time. So I would like you to close
your eyes again. Put yourself back into the context of planning your statement. Think of
all the thoughts and emotions that came to your mind. Again, think out loud, reporting
anything that comes to mind.”
Deepening (repeat back confusing points)
“Some of this may be repetitive, but please just try to answer the question fully. You may repeat
yourself, but hopefully you can expand based on the specific question as well.”
1) Tell me about your goals and/or concerns during this process.
o make sure they talk about goals AND concerns
2) How long did it take you to decide how you wanted to provide your statement?
3) Tell me about the strategies you chose to use in order to come across as truthful and why
you chose to use them.
4) Why did you choose to include the specific information you did?
5) What was it about the situation of this interview that made you believe the strategy and
story you chose was the best one to use while providing the statement?
6) Did you consider other alternatives to your strategy to provide this statement?
7) What led you to reject this alternative?
8) Tell me about how hard you had, or did not have to think in order to create your
statement to be believed by the interviewer.
9) Tell me about any emotions you experienced in having to create your account and
anticipated experiencing when providing the account.
10) Specifically, to what extent did you experience guilt for having to providing your
statement?
11) Fear or anxiety of potentially being judged deceptive by the interviewer?
12) Excitement at the possibility of leading the interviewer to believe you?
13) Likert questions 1-3
14) Tell me about your concerns regarding your perceived believability by the interviewer or
other people who might judge your truthfulness.
15) To what extent did you consider controlling your behavior (verbal and nonverbal) in
order to appear credible?
16) What specifically, if anything, did you plan to do in order to accomplish this?
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17) Likert question 4
18) To what extent was monitoring the interviewer’s behavior and reactions a concern?
19) Likert question 6
20) How hard did you have to work to keep the details of your story straight and consistent?
21) Likert question 5
22) Did you plan to rely on an exact previous experience as part of, or your entire statement?
23) If yes: Did you plan to rely on one specific experience or multiple experiences?
24) If they report using a previous experience: Were the details you planned on using in the
story exactly how you previously experienced them or did you plan on using a general
storyline you have for a “typical” scenario?
25) If they referred to using scripts/gist/semantic memory: Did you plan on using any details
that did happen in a previous experience exactly as you planned to explain anywhere in
your statement?
26) If they referred to using verbatim: Did you plan on providing any details that were not
exactly as you experienced and, instead, where formed from your idea of a “typical
example” of this part of your story?
27) Clarify their use of gist vs. verbatim. Was it one or the other for the entire story? A bit of
each?
28) Likert question 7 and 8

Condition 2: Participants who provided autobiographical statement
PA undirected probe
1) “I am going to ask you to think aloud. This may be new and unfamiliar to you, but please
know that there are no wrong answers, so you should not guess. I am only interested in
knowing what is going through your mind. Your thoughts will help us learn about how
individuals formulate autobiographical statements. Feel free to say anything that you’re
thinking. I want you to close your eyes and think back to when you provided your
autobiographical account. Take as much time as you would like to think about this time.
As you are doing this, tell me out loud any thoughts that come to mind. Try to be as
complete as possible.”
2) “Is that all? Okay, that was great. Now, I would like you to close your eyes again. Put
yourself back into the context of providing your statement. Think of all the thoughts and
emotions that came to your mind. Again, think out loud, reporting anything that comes to
mind.”
Video play-back
1) I’m going to play the video of you providing your statement. Please watch this and as it’s
playing, tell me what you were thinking or feeling. Consider it a play-by-play account of
what’s going on in your head for your statement. Please feel free to repeat yourself, but
also expand on what you have previously reported.
Deepening (repeat back confusing points)
“Some of this may be repetitive, but please just try to answer the question fully. You may repeat
yourself, but hopefully you can expand based on the specific question as well.”
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1) Tell me about your goals and/or concerns during this process.
2) What knowledge was necessary, helpful, or what would have been helpful in this
situation?
3) Tell me about the strategies you used during the interview to come across as truthful and
why you used them.
4) Did you change your strategy at any point during the interview?
5) Why did you choose to include the specific information you did?
6) What was it about the situation of this interview that made you believe the strategy and
story you chose was the best one to use while providing the statement?
7) Did you consider other alternatives for your strategy to as you provided this statement?
8) What led you to reject this alternative?
9) Tell me about how hard you had, or did not have to think in order to provide your
statement.
10) Tell me about any emotions you experienced in having to provide your account.
11) Specifically, to what extent did you experience guilt for having to providing your
statement?
12) Fear or anxiety of potentially being judged deceptive by the interviewer?
13) Excitement at the possibility of leading the interviewer to believe you?
14) Likert questions 1-3
15) Tell me about your concerns regarding your perceived believability by the interviewer or
other people who might judge your truthfulness in the future.
16) To what extent did you attempt to control your behavior (verbal and nonverbal) in order
to appear credible?
17) What specifically, if anything, did you do in order to accomplish this?
18) Likert question 4
19) To what extent was monitoring the interviewer’s behavior and reactions a concern?
20) Likert question 6
21) How hard did you have to work to keep the details of your story straight and consistent?
22) Likert question 5
23) Did you rely on an exact previous experience as part of, or your entire statement?
24) If yes: Did you rely on one specific experience or multiple experiences?
25) If they report using a previous experience: Were the details you used in the story exactly
how you previously experienced them or did you use a general storyline you have for a
“typical” scenario?
26) If they referred to using scripts/gist/semantic memory: Did you use any details that did
happen in a previous experience exactly as you explained anywhere in your statement?
27) If they referred to using verbatim: Did you provide any details that were not exactly as
you experienced and, instead, where formed from your idea of a “typical example” of this
part of your story?
28) Clarify their use of gist vs. verbatim. Was it one or the other for the entire story? A bit of
each?
29) Likert question 7 and 8
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Appendix B: Study 1 Autobiographical Statement Instructions
“Imagine that you are suspected of a crime that occurred between the hours of 6:00 pm
and 11:00 pm on Friday night that you did commit. You want to do everything in your power to
make your lie one that the interviewer will believe. You can lie in any way that will accomplish
this. Use a strategy and story that will make yours believable.
Another individual who has been trained in detecting deception will be the one to
interview you. This individual does not know whether you are lying or telling him the truth. It
is their job to successfully determine which it is. It is your job to convince them that you are
being truthful. If, after the interview, they judge you as truthful, you get to keep the $5 I have
given you. If, on the other hand, they correctly judge you as being deceptive, you have to give
them the $5. Do you have any questions?”
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Appendix C: Scaled Measures for Study 1
1. How guilty did you feel about lying/potentially having to lie?
Not at all
Moderately guilty
Extremely
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2. How fearful were you about the prospect of being caught and judged deceptive?
Not at all
Moderately fearful
Extremely
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
3. How excited were you at the possibility of deceiving the interviewer?
Not at all
Moderately excited
Extremely
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
4. How hard did you work/plan on working to control your behavior in order to appear credible?
Didn’t try at all
Tried some
Tried extremely hard
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
5. How easy or difficult was it to keep the details of your statement straight and consistent?
Extremely easy
Neither easy nor difficult
Extremely difficult
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
6. How much did you think about and plan on monitoring/monitor the interviewer’s behavior in order to get an idea of how
s/he was judging you?
Not at all
A moderate amount
Did this the entire time
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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7.

“Verbatim” is memory that consists of vivid, detailed representations of a past event. It contains sensory information
(sights, smells, sounds, etc.). “Gist” is the general representation and “bottom line” memories you have of an event.
This might involve memories of events, but those memories are based on your thoughts and reasoning of how the event
took place, not an actual, vivid representation of it. If you are familiar with semantic and episodic memory, gist can be
considered semantic memory and verbatim is episodic memory. Please ask the interviewer for clarification if this does
not make sense to you. To what extent did you use/plan on using one or the other in your story?
Entirely gist
A great majority A slight majority An even mix of A great majority A slight majority Entirely verbatim
gist
gist
both
verbatim
verbatim
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8. To what extent did you feel comfortable lying in the way that you did/planned to lie?
Extremely
Moderately
A little
Neither Comfortable
A little
Moderate
Extremely
Uncomfortable Uncomfortable Uncomfortable nor Uncomfortable
Comfortable Comfortable
Comfortable
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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Appendix D: Coding Scheme for Study 1
Video #: ___ Coder: __
Motivators
1) Generally cared or didn’t care about being caught/being believed (+1 cared, -1 didn’t care) ____
2) Extrinsic motivation – (+1 yes, -1 no) ___
a) Get money ___
b) Credit ___
3) Intrinsic motivation – (+1 yes, -1 no) ___
a) Test abilities (see if a good liar, be best liar) ___
4) Get it over with as fast as possible ___
Other: ____________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
Impression Management/Behavioral control theory
5) General impressions
a) Appear truthful/honest ___
b) Sound nice/innocent ___
c) Appear natural (casual conversation) ___
d) Stay calm ___
e) Be serious ___
6) Chose strategy because believability by interviewer ___
7) Delivery of story ___
a) Don’t make it repetitive ___
b) Stick to the story planned ___
i) Didn’t say everything planned/forgot details ___
8) Non-verbal attempted control – code “e” and “f” for if they mentioned it before or after prompt,
respectively; code “g” if they are in the planning condition and say they would have thought about it when
they provided their statements
a) Yes ___
i) Hands/arms ___
(1) Crossed/in lap ___
ii) Legs/feet ___
iii) Eyes ___
(1) Contact ___
iv) Fingers ___
v) Facial expressions/mouth ___
vi) Touch head/hair ___
vii) Posture ___
b) No ___
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9) Verbal/vocal attempted control – code “e” and “f” for if they mentioned it before or after prompt,
respectively; code “g” if they are in the planning condition and say they would have thought about it when
they provided
a) Yes ___
i) Rate of speech ___
ii) Fluently/flowing ___
(1) No pauses ___
iii) Speak clearly/don’t stutter ___
(1) Ums/uhs ___
iv) Strong voice ___
v) Pitch/tone ___
vi) Contradict ___
b) No ___
10) Realized they were displaying a verbal or nonverbal cue while speaking (provide only) ___
11) Did things because they have knowledge of detecting deception (Lie to Me) ___
12) Monitoring of interviewer – code “g” if they are in the planning condition and say they would have thought
about it when they provided
a) Yes ___
(1) Questions they asked/would ask ___
(2) Facial expression ___
(3) Body posture/shifting ___
(4) Voice ___
ii) Started to but didn’t get any information ___
(1) Response would have depended on what they would say ___
iii) Actually changed strategy/behavior based on this ___
(1) Provide more detail/info ___
iv) Other ___________________________________________________________________
b) No ___
i) Would have been distracting ___
ii) Purposefully didn’t pay attention ___
Other: ____________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
Memory reconstructions
13) Formation of story
a) Simple/complex (+1 simpler, -1 complex) ___
i) Simple/not detailed
(1) Don’t get blocked into a lie ___
(2) Story that would lead to few follow ups ___
(3) Too much detail would seem made up ___
ii) Complex/detailed
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(1) So it seems like I was there ___
(2) Something that kept it busy ___
(3) Create support for story ___
(a) Add witnesses, public ___
(b) Fabricate proof ___
b) Unique/not too normal situation ___
c) Everyday situation ___
i) Use familiar/typical things ___
(1) What I didn’t do, but could have ___
ii) Use the truth ___
(1) Past memories/but not that day ___
(2) ½ truths ___
iii) Pieced together ___
d) Make interview personal (for rapport with interviewer)___
e) Timing ___
i) Get timing straight, logical order ___
ii) Fit within time frame/take up the time (6-11pm) ___
f) Something logical for story (e.g., students work) ___
g) Repeat story to self ___
c) Influence of strategy ___
i. Other strategy would be harder to create and remember details for ___
ii. More comfortable/less time to believe it themselves ___
iii. First thing to mind/fresh in mind ___
Other: ____________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
Gist/verbatim
14) Gist ___
15) Verbatim ___
a) One experience ___
b) Multiple experiences ___
16) Half and half ___
17) Verbatim for small details only ___
a) Verbatim for responses to specific questions ___
Other: _____________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
Emotional theory
18) Nervous/anxiety vs. calm (+1 calm, 0 not nervous, -1 nervous) ___
a) Anxious/nervous
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i) Situation ___
ii) Judged liar ___
iii) For self (challenge) ___
iv) When – planning, when he entered, beginning, follow-ups, when mess up (circle one or more) ___
19) Fear (+1 fearful, 0 not) ___
20) Guilt (+1 guilty, 0 not) ___
a) Would have if real situation ___
b) None/less so since I had done it before ___
21) Excitement (+1 excited, 0 not) ___
a) Yes
i) For person to believe story ___
ii) $ ___
iii) For me to be a good liar ___
22) Other emotions (list) ___
Other: ____________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
Cognitive complexity theory
1) Difficulty (+1 easy, 0 neutral, -1 hard) ___
a) No/easy
i) Because it’s familiar/the truth ___
ii) Lie a lot ___
b) Yes
i) For follow up questions/answers ___
ii) Details ___
(1) Creating them ___
(2) Keeping them straight ___
iii) Timing ___
iv) Planning vs. Providing (provide participants only) ___
2) Other:
_______________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
Comments/notes:
__________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
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Appendix E: Cues
Details
Sensory Details
Spatial Details
Temporal Details

Not Present

Not Present

Occasional

Frequent

Present
Present
(1 or 2 times) (3 or more times)

Admitted Lack of Memory
Spontaneous Corrections
Cognitive Operations

Clarity/vividness

Very Few Details/
Numerous Details/
Very Vague
Unsure
Very Clear
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|

Plausibility

Not at all Realistic
Unsure
Completely Realistic
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|

Logical Structure

Not at all
Unsure
Extremely
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|

Nervousness

Did Not Think Hard
Unsure
Thought Extremely Hard
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
Extremely Relaxed/
Extremely Tense/
Comfortable
Unsure
Nervous
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|

Negativity/Complaints

Extremely Positive
Neutral/Unsure
Extremely Negative
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|

Thought hard
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Cue Information Materials
TRUTH Indicators
(a) Sensory Details:
-Are details provided regarding the sounds heard?
e.g., “It was really loud” “I heard a door slam shut” “Her dog was barking”
Please indicate whether there no auditory details provided (“Not Present”), there were several
auditory details provided (“Occasional”), or whether there were many auditory details provided
(“Frequent”).
(b) Spatial Details:
-Are details provided regarding spatial locations?
e.g., “The table was next to a window” “I turned right onto the highway” “I was sitting
between Scott and Mike”
Please indicate whether there no spatial details provided (“Not Present”), there were several
spatial details provided (“Occasional”), or whether there were many spatial details provided
(“Frequent”).
(c) Temporal Details:
-Are details provided regarding time?
e.g., “I got there about 5 minutes later” “That was at about 10:25” “It was really late when I
left”
Please indicate whether there no temporal details provided (“Not Present”), there were several
temporal details provided (“Occasional”), or whether there were many temporal details
provided (“Frequent”).
(d) Admitted Lack of Memory:
-At any point does s/he respond “I’m not sure” or “I don’t remember,” etc?
e.g., “I don’t remember what my mom ordered for dinner” “I don’t know when, but it was
late”
Please indicate whether there was no admitted lack of memory (“Not Present”), lack of memory
was admitted once or twice, or lack of memory was admitted three or more times.
(e) Spontaneous Corrections:
-At any point does s/he change his/her response or indicate a previous answer was wrong.
e.g., “Oh wait, Dave drove, not Eddie” “I said it started at 9, but I don’t think that’s right – it
was earlier.”
Please indicate whether there were no spontaneous corrections (“Not Present”), there were one
or two spontaneous corrections, there were three or more spontaneous corrections.
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(f) Cognitive Operations (i.e., metacognition):
-At any point does s/he make inferences about their thoughts at the time of the event
e.g., “It appeared to me that she didn’t know the layout of the building.”
Please indicate whether there were no cognitive operations (“Not Present”), there were one or
two cognitive operations, there were three or more cognitive operations.
(g) Clarity/vividness:
-Is the statement clear, sharp, and vivid (instead of dim and vague?
Please indicate on a scale from “Very few details/Very vague” to” Numerous details/complete”
how detailed the story was. If you are unsure, please mark “Unsure” in the middle of the scale.
(h) Plausibility
-Does the story make sense? Is it plausible? Is it believable? Or, are there any
contradictions/discrepancies? Are you left feeling that something is off about the story?
Please indicate on a scale from “Not at all” to “Completely” how much sense the story made. If
you are unsure, please mark “Unsure” in the middle of the scale.
(i) Logical structure
-Logical str5ucture is present if the statement is coherent and does not contain logical
inconsistencies or contradictions.
Please indicate on a scale from “Not at all” to “Completely” how well logically structured the
statement is. If you are unsure, please mark “Unsure” in the middle of the scale.
DECEPTION Indicators
(a) Thought hard:
-Overall, how hard did s/he have to think to tell his/her story and answer the questions? Use
verbal and non-verbal information.
Please indicate on a scale from “Did not think hard” to “Thought extremely hard” how hard the
story-teller had to think. If you are unsure, please mark “Unsure” in the middle of the scale.
(b) Tension/Nervousness:
-Overall to you, does s/he appear anxious or is s/he comfortable? Consider both vocal and
behavioral cues.
e.g., Is his voice tense? Is his posture rigid? Does he appear to be uncomfortable or nervous
in the situation? Is he fidgeting? Does he avoid eye contact?
Please indicate on a scale from “Extremely relaxed/comfortable” to “Extremely tense/nervous”
how nervous or tense the story-teller appeared. If you are unsure, please mark “Unsure” in the
middle of the scale.
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(c) Negativity/Complaints:
-Overall, does s/he leave you with a positive or negative impression? Consider his/her words
and facial expressions.
e.g., If he complains, is difficult, or has a hostile tone of voice, this is more negative than if
he is smiling, friendly and cooperative.
Please indicate on a scale from “Extremely positive” to “Extremely negative” what your
impression of the story-teller was. If you are unsure, please mark “Unsure” in the middle of the
scale.
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Appendix F: Study 2 Autobiographical Statement Instructions
All:
“In this study, I will ask you to create two statements - one deceptive and one truthful. I
will explain what I would like you to do for those statements in just one minute. Another
individual who has been trained in detecting deception will be the one to interview you. This
individual does not know whether you will be lying both times, telling the truth both times, or
one of each. It is their job to successfully determine which each one is. It is your job to
convince them that you are being truthful in each statement. If, after the interview, they judge
you as truthful in both cases, you get to keep the $5 I have given you. If, on the other hand, they
correctly detect which one is a lie and which one is a truth, you have to give them the $5. Do
you have any questions?”
Truth:
“Imagine that you are accused of a crime that occurred between the hours of 6:00 pm and
11:00 pm on Thursday/Friday/Saturday night that you did not commit. You need to convince
the interviewer that you are telling the truth. Think about everything you can remember from
this time period. Remember, you are suspected of a crime, so you will want to do everything in
your power to make your story convincing. Your story should be 100% truthful. Do not provide
any information that is not truthful. Other individuals, in addition to the interviewer, will be
watching this video and your job is to convince them that you are telling the truth.”
Temporal displacement:
“Imagine that you are suspected of a crime that occurred between the hours of 6:00 pm
and 11:00 pm on Thursday/Friday/Saturday night that you did commit. You want to do
everything in your power to make your lie one that the interviewer will believe. One strategy
people use to lie that is very effective is to take what they did on a previous night and tell the
story as if they did it on the night in question. I would like you to take your actual experience
from a memorable night for which you remember the experience very well, and that would be
believable on the night in question, and tell your story as if it happened on the night in question.
Do not create details that you are unsure of. This is still a lie since you are claiming you did this
at a different time than it actually happened. Therefore, you need to make sure to tell your story
in a way that will be believable. This should be an event for which you have a strong memory.
It should also be believable for the night in question. For example, if you are providing a
statement about a Friday night, you should not describe your experience at a UTEP football
game since those occur on Saturdays. Other individuals, in addition to the interviewer, will be
watching this video and it is your job to convince them that you are telling the truth.”

Novel lie:
“Imagine that you are suspected of a crime that occurred between the hours of 6:00 pm
and 11:00 pm on Thursday/Friday/Saturday night that you did commit. You want to do
everything in your power to make your lie one that the interviewer will believe. One strategy
people use that is very effective is to use their memories for what a typical weekend night might
include. What I mean by this is that we all have scripts for how certain events go. For example,
you might have a script of going to a bar where you first walk in the door and have your ID
checked. Then you go up to the bar and order a drink and pay for that drink, etc. These are not
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necessarily memories of a specific incident. They are frameworks that our memory has created
to allow us to easily access and use it. Therefore, I would like you to use this type of memory to
create a deceptive narrative. The story should not be something that you have exactly
experienced. Remember, you are telling a story that needs to be believable, so make sure you
think of and say everything you can to make it believable. Other individuals, in addition to the
interviewer, will be watching this video and it is your job to convince them that you are telling
the truth.”
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Appendix G: Cues Relied upon in Study 3
How much did you rely on the following cues to make your judgments in these videos?

1) Sensory details
Not at all
To a moderate degree
To an extremely high degree
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

2) Temporal details
Not at all
To a moderate degree
To an extremely high degree
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

3) Spatial details
Not at all
To a moderate degree
To an extremely high degree
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

4) Spontaneous corrections
Not at all
To a moderate degree
To an extremely high degree
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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5) Admitted lack of memory
Not at all
To a moderate degree
To an extremely high degree
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

6) Cognitive operations
Not at all
To a moderate degree
To an extremely high degree
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

7) Clarity/vividness
Not at all
To a moderate degree
To an extremely high degree
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8) Plausibility
Not at all
To a moderate degree
To an extremely high degree
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

9) Logical structure
Not at all
To a moderate degree
To an extremely high degree
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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10) Thought hard
Not at all
To a moderate degree
To an extremely high degree
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

11) Nervousness
Not at all
To a moderate degree
To an extremely high degree
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

12) Negativity
Not at all
To a moderate degree
To an extremely high degree
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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